American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain
Theses and Dissertations

Student Research

Spring 6-15-2021

Copyright and Creativity: Critiques of the US System and Possible
Reform Strategy for Egypt
Dina Magdy El-hussieny selite
dinaelhussieny@aucegypt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation

APA Citation
selite, D. M. (2021).Copyright and Creativity: Critiques of the US System and Possible Reform Strategy for
Egypt [Master's Thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1660

MLA Citation
selite, Dina Magdy El-hussieny. Copyright and Creativity: Critiques of the US System and Possible Reform
Strategy for Egypt. 2021. American University in Cairo, Master's Thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1660

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at AUC Knowledge
Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC
Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact thesisadmin@aucegypt.edu.

American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain
Theses and Dissertations
Spring 6-15-2021

Dina_Magdy El-Hussieny_Selite_thesis
Dina Magdy El-hussieny selite

Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Student Research

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
Law Department

COPYRIGHT AND CREATIVITY: CRITIQUES OF THE US
SYSTEM AND POSSIBLE REFORM STRATEGY FOR EGYPT

A Thesis Submitted to the
Department of Law
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the LL.M. Degree in
International and Comparative Law

By

Dina Magdy El-Hussieny Selite

May 2021

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

COPYRIGHT AND CREATIVITY: CRITIQUES OF THE US SYSTEM AND
POSSIBLE REFORM STRATEGY FOR EGYPT

A Thesis Submitted by
Dina Magdy El-Hussieny Selite
to the Department of Law
May 2021
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
LL.M. Degree in International and Comparative Law
has been approved by the committee composed of
Professor Hani Sayed
Thesis Supervisor _________________________
American University in Cairo
Date ___________________
Professor Naglaa Rizk
Thesis First Reader _________________________
American University in Cairo
Date ___________________
Professor Dalia Hussein
Thesis Second Reader _______________________________
American University in Cairo
Date ___________________
Professor Thomas Skouteris
Law Department Chair ________________________________
Date ____________________
Ambassador Nabil Fahmy
Dean of GAPP _______________________________
Date ____________________

ii

DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to my mother and the soul of my father, may he rest in peace, who have
supported and encouraged me throughout my journey of study. Although my father is not
part of this world now I have very special feeling of love and gratitude towards everything
he did with me. His memory will continue to guide my life and I owe everything I achieved
in my life to him and my mother.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To be able to finalize my thesis during such a critical and challenging time the whole
world is facing due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in addition to the personal challenges I
faced through this time requires great support and coordination. I want to thank both my
family and family in law for their constant support throughout the whole journey of my
academic study and specially through the process of writing my thesis. A special thanks to
my mother and husband for their patience, support and most of all for believing I can make
it no matter how hard the circumstances were, without you I would have not made it.
I also want to thank my colleagues and friends for their constant encouragement,
your words lifted me up during my worse times and guided me back to the right track.
A Special thanks to my friend and colleague Ahmed Tony for his great support and
help in the process of writing my thesis.
Moreover, I would like to acknowledge the learnings I have gained through studying
in the LL.M program and wish to thank my committee for their time, guidance and
recommendations.
Finally, I’m very grateful to have been chosen by Yousef Jameel GAPP Public
Leadership Program, without this fellowship program I would have never been able to join
the AUC and benefit from this great academic experience. Mr. Jameel I owe you a lot and
will always remember that you are the main reason I reached this phase in my life.

iv

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
Department of Law

COPYRIGHT AND CREATIVITY: CRITIQUES OF THE US SYSTEM AND
POSSIBLE REFORM STRATEGY FOR EGYPT
Dina Magdy El-Hussieny Selite
Supervised by Professor Hany Sayed
ABSTRACT
The optimum goal of copyright is to maximize the production of creative works and
innovations by balancing the benefits of the copyright owners and public users. This balance
requires securing the rights of copyright owners to induce authors to produce their creations,
while at the same time providing public users with regulated freedom to use copyrighted
work to produce new creations and innovations. In this context, it is necessary to explore
the problems of the copyright system and address them in the optimum way to achieve the
goals of copyright. This paper analyzes the problems of the United States copyright system
that obstruct the process of creation and innovation. These problems directly threaten the
users who attempt to use copyrighted work to produce new innovations and impact their
choice to proceed with their creations. It also analyzes the proposed reforms addressing such
problems. These reforms focus on either eliminating the existing ambiguity of some of the
copyright terms, or developing the copyright infringement structure and its available
remedies. This paper argues that eliminating the ambiguity of copyright terms will not lead
to effective results in achieving the goals of copyright. This is because it will be impossible
to provide measures and interpretation that copes with the rapid progress of the
technological and digital innovations. In addition, it is argued that this ambiguity is intended
by the legislator to overcome the gap between the system and the rapid technological
development, by granting the judges discretionary power to decide on copyright disputes
on ad hoc basis. This paper concludes that it is most effective to introduce reform to the
infringement and remedial structure that is capable of limiting the threats that users may be
expose to. Moreover, it argues that developing countries, including Egypt, can benefit from
the proposed analysis, of the United Stated system, in developing their copyright
legislations. It proposes a reform tailored to conform with the Egyptian system, which
considers the said problems and motivates production of more creative works.
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I.

Introduction
Technology and digital innovations have become key cornerstones in all fields.

Technology has its impact on innovation through facilitating means of communication,
exchange and sharing, which accordingly accelerated the process of producing new
inventions. This resulted in a global change and transformation of cultures and perspectives.
In this context, since copyright is closely connected with technology and its development,
it is crucial to understand the role it plays and raise awareness on its importance, scope,
controversies and the debates going around it.
Copyright grants authors of original creative works, that is expressed through a
tangible medium, monopoly powers by granting them the exclusive right to control the use
of their created works. This sort of legal protection and monopoly is to achieve one ultimate
goal that is to provide an incentive for authors to encourage them to produce more creative
works. The bond connecting copyright with technological progress is now inseparable.
Copyright is unquestionably included in our daily uses and activities. Computers, cell
phones, tabs and all sort of technological devices we use are operating through software that
is protected by copyright. The maps that help navigating our directions are copyrightable.
The music we listen to, the books we read, the pictures we take, the movies, theaters and all
types of motion pictures we watch, social media plat forms, applications, and many other
countless ideas that are expressed and produced, are copyright’s subject matters and
regulated under the rules of the copyright system. This situates copyright in a position where
it needs constant development along with the technological progress to be able to embrace
and deal with the new inventions and innovations.
That said, the users’ level of unawareness of the scope of copyright, and the right
and obligations arising accordingly, is surprising. A normal internet user may not be aware
that downloading or sharing of a music file or even a purchased program, such as Adobe,
or Microsoft Office for example, without obtaining the proper license is considered a
copyright infringement. A simple student joining a band would not be aware that his or her
music composition could be considered as a copy of another existing composition, which
could constitute a copyright infringement, and may lead to exposing this student to
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excessive damages, and imprisonment penalty in some jurisdictions. In a recent interesting
case, a copyright dispute arose around a selfie photo taken by a monkey. Both the
photographer and “People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals” (non-profit organization
presenting the monkey) alleged the copyright ownership of the photo. This photo went viral
over the internet and generated significant profits to the photographer. The debate ended by
reaching a settlement where the photographer agreed to pay the sanctuary, where the
monkey lived, royalty fee for the future revenues of the photo.1 Today, users are disputing
around who is the original author of a created meme that goes viral over the internet and
generates profit,2 and there are many other examples that show how copyright is attached
to our daily normal activities. It is therefore important to raise awareness about copyright,
the scope of its protection and the problems it faces to ensure that its system is well
structured and developed to cope with the technological progress.
The notion of copyright emerged with the development of printing press in the
United Kingdom, a technology that for the first time in that era reduced the lead time to
reproduce books which made copying easily occur without authorization. Lobbyists sought
to cease the tremendous impact of unauthorized copying by encouraging authors to issues
licenses to print their books.3 Accordingly, the world’s first copyright statute “The Statue
of Anne” was enacted in England in 1710.4 Inspired by The Statue of Anne, the United
States enacted its first copyright legislation in 1790. The said legislation secured the authors’
rights against unauthorized copying of maps, charts, and books. This Act was followed by
many revisions extending the set of protected creations until the final and recent copyrights
act “The Copyright Act of 1976” (“the Copyright Act”), including eight different sets of
subject matters of copyright.5 The interpretation of each of the subject matters became
1

Can
the
monkey
selfie
case
teach
us
anything
about
copyright
law?,
,https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2018/01/article_0007.html (last visited Apr 10, 2021).
2
Lee J. Matalon, Modern Problems Require Modern Solutions: Internet Memes and Copyright, 98 TEX. L.
REV. 405 (2019).
3
The history of copyright | Australian Libraries Copyright Committee, https://libcopyright.org.au/the-historyof-copyright.
4
Doteasy, History of Copyright. 2005, http://historyofcopyright.org.
5
See
Copyright
Act of
1976,
17
U.S.C.
§§
101-1332
(2012),
Section
101,
https://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html. Works of authorship includes literary works; musical works
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different along with the technological progress. For instance, in the past, the protection of
literary work included novels, stories, short stories and poems. Today, literary work
protection includes computers software. This example illustrates the need of constant
development of copyright law.
For years scholars have been focusing on demonstrating the importance of copyright
protection to encourage authors to express their ideas and produce creative works to the
world. There are arguments calling for including information technology inventions in the
realm of copyright.6 Economists focused their scholarship on displaying the importance of
copyright’s role in investments and international trade.7 Arguments around the importance
of regulating intellectual property internationally spread all over the world until
international treaties were concluded and came into force, including the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”)8 and the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”).9
Nevertheless, the authors’ monopoly powers had various outcomes with the
significant and rapid development of technology and communication. Researchers started
to realize that the tools copyright relies on to incentivize creativity have their negative
impact on the process of creation.10 Arguments started to formulate around the effect of
such monopoly powers granted to authors over the freedom of creation and production.11
Debates around copyright and its problems continued, and calls for reforms of the copyright

including any accompanying words; dramatic works including any accompanying music; pantomimes and
choreographic works; pictorial, graphic and sculpture works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
sound recording; and architectural works.
6
See John M. Newman, Copyright Free Economic, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol.66:5:1409.
7
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Fall, 1999, Vol. 7, No. 1, Symposium: Globalization at the Margins:
Perspectives on Globalization from Developing States (Fall, 1999), at 117-189.
8
World Intellectual Property Organization. 1982. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works: texts. [Geneva]: World Intellectual Property Organization.
9
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
10
See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, Harvard Law Review, March 2015, Vol. 128, No.5, at
1383.
11
Id.
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system expanded.12 These calls did not only request to expand copyright subject matters and
include new inventions in the realm of copyright protection, but also demanded to ensure
that ultimate goal of copyright is achieved and that authors as well as public both are
benefiting fairly from the created works.
Copyright notion plays an important role in the legal system and has direct impact
on states ‘economic growth and cultural activities. This is because the industries concerned
with copyright’s subject matters are considered a substantial part of the investment and trade
business of countries, which constructs their economy and have direct impact on their
revenues. For instance in the United States, Hollywood creative industries accounted for
3.2% of the United States goods and services in 2011.13 Motion picture and video production
and distribution industry in the United States in 2019 generated total revenue of $74.95
billion.14 The American film and television industry in 2020 supported 2.5 million jobs and
presented $181 billion of the total wages.15 The United States recorded music business
generated in 2019 total revenue of $11.1 billion.16 All of these figures forecasts the
importance of copyright and reflect its impact on the economy of countries.
The reach of Industries affected by copyright protection is not only related to
movies. Music, and other forms of artistic industries relate to copyright. Science, education,
books, research, journalism are all fields associated to copyrights as well. Computers,
mobile phones and other related technological industries involves copyright to great extent
of their business. For instance, in using “iTunes”, Apple relies on two business models: first,
the copyright law which governs what actions consumers are allowed to take in the music
12

See Abraham bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Restructuring Copy Rights Infringement, Texas Law Review,
Volume 98, Issue 4 (03/2020).
13
Associated Press in Washington, Hollywood has blockbuster impact on US economy that tourism fails to
match, THE GUARDIAN (2013), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/dec/05/arts-culture-us-economygdp (last visited Feb 18, 2021).
14
Revenue
of U.S. motion
picture and
video
industry
2005-2019, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/184140/estimated-revenue-of-us-motion-picture-and-video-industrysince-2005/.
15
Film Ratings | Motion Picture Association, https://www.motionpictures.org/film-ratings/.
16
US Recorded Music Revenue Reaches $11.1 Billion in 2019, 79% From Streaming: RIAA, BILLBOARD,
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8551881/riaa-music-industry-2019-revenue-streaming-vinyldigital-physical.
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purchased from iTunes. The second model is the contract, which is licenses agreements
entered with the iTunes consumers that govern the general terms and conditions of their use
of purchased music: this in some cases may contain more restricts than what is permitted
under copyright’s law, but it never contains less restrictions.17 Moreover, the software used
in iPhone, iPad, Mac, and other Apple products are copyright’s subject matter that
extensively relies on copyright law in its protection. The recent ruling issued by the
Southern District of Florida US Federal District Court in Apple v. Corellium, in 2020 is a
great manifestation on the role copyright law plays in such industries and its significance in
shaping the economy of countries. 18 In this case Corellium developed a product that allows
users to create tailored virtual models of iPhones using iOS files loaded by the user. The
court decided that Corellium’s act of copying is fair use. This ruling demonstrated the role
copyright law plays in such industries and its significance in shaping the economy of
countries. The United States software industry in 2018 generated revenues amounting to
$183.3 billion.19 According to CNBC, in 2020, Apple’s revenues passed Saudi Arabia’s
Aramco (the world’s most famous oil and gas company) revenues 20(the latter was the
world’s most profitable company in 2019).21
As illustrated above, in the US, many of the industries that are directly touched and
concerned with copyright laws have increasing and significant revenues that form a
fundamental component of the country’s economy. As such, there is an increasing
understanding of the significance of safeguarding and enforcing copyright laws in the
context of the role it plays in such, and other, significant industries. Scholars has been
debating around the impact of adopting strong copyright policies on the flourishing of the

17

See Fisher, William W. 2004. iTunes: How Copyright, Contract, and Technology Shape the Business of
Digital Media. Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society Research Publication.
18
Apple Inc. v. Corellium, LLC, CASE NO. 19-81160-CIV-SMITH (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2020).
19
Software
market
revenue
in
United
States
2016-2021,
STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/forecasts/963605/software-revenue-in-united-states.
20
Jay Peters, Apple is now the world’s most valuable publicly traded company, THE VERGE (2020),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/31/21350154/apple-worlds-most-valuable-company-saudi-aramco.
21
Supra note 18.The market valuation Apple had in 2020, reached $1.84 trillion, while Aramco had $ 1.76
trillion. Apple Inc. v. Corellium, LLC, No. 9:2019cv81160 - Document 381 (S.D. Fla. 2020), JUSTIA LAW,
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/florida/flsdce/9:2019cv81160/555634/381/.
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creative ideas founding these industries, and its leading effects on the economic growth of
countries.
A strong copyright system reflects a system that expands copyright protection at the
expense of the public domain.22 This approach limits the exceptions of the use of
copyrighted works, which provide very limited available choices for users within the public
domain after precluding the copyright’s protected works.23 It is also common in such system
to impose heavy deterring sanctions on infringers who use copyrighted works.
There are many doctrines that reflect the constraints and limitations of copyrights,
which are strictly adopted by strong copyright protection systems, while in more flexible
copyright protection systems they are adopted in more flexible ways that allow a certain
extent of freedom for users. An illustration of a strong copyright protection notion is the
monopoly given exclusively to the copyright owner to prepare derivative works, which
limits the rights of other innovators to build on the already existing work and create an
innovative work out of it.24 On the other hand, the “fair use” doctrine is considered an
example of weak or more flexible copyright protection system. However, even such s
doctrine can be strictly applied, which reflects the adoption of strong copyright protection,
or expansively applied, which reflects flexible copyright protection. 25 The US Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeal’s decision in Bridgeport Music, Inc v. Dimensions Films is a clear example
that illustrates the adoption of strong copyright protection. In its decision, the Court laid
down the principle of “get a license or do not sample”26 in a dispute around a two seconds
three-note guitar riff which was extended to sixteen seconds and repeated in a sound
recording by a rap group.

22

Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright after Golan v.Holder, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 1082 (2013).
23
Joseph P. Fishman, supra note 10, at 1383.
24
Id, at 1393.
25
See Id, at 1397.
26
BRIDGEPORT MUSIC, INC. v. DIMENSION FILMS 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
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For the above-mentioned reasons, and the role copyright plays in shaping the
economy of the countries, it is significant to acknowledge the problems of the copyright
system and work on their reform to help the industries connected to copyright flourish.
Moreover, analyzing the copyright system in the US is specifically important as one of the
world’s leading countries in relation to industries that are connected to copyright. Being the
world’s largest economy, analyzing the US copyright system would be a reflection of a
model system that the developing countries could consider while developing their copyright
systems.
In this thesis, I provide an explanation of the United Stated copyright system and
its structure. I identify the main problems of the system and their impact on the process of
creativity. I argue against the application of a strong copyright system and claim that more
flexible copyright protection serves better the goals of copyright, that is to incentivize
creativity. Flexible copyright protection can be achieved through expansion of the
application of copyright exceptions, like fair use, compulsory licensing, and developing a
system that permits the use of orphan works. It can be also achieved through restructuring
copyright infringements and its available remedies.
In this thesis, I do not argue for eliminating the ambiguity of copyright’s terms and
doctrines. I rather argue that reforms seeking to develop and remove the ambiguity of the
doctrines and terms of copyright will not be as effective as reforms that aim to restructure
the copyright infringement structure and its available remedies. This is attributed to two
reasons: the first is due to the fact that such ambiguity could be intended by the legislator to
allow the courts to rule on copyright disputes on ad hoc basis;27 the second, is because no
matter how such doctrines and terms are developed, they will not be able to cope with the
rapid progress in technology and embrace all its changes. Thus, I conclude that copyright
system reform could be made through classifying the copyright infringement structure and
available remedies, by introducing into the system categories for different types of

27

See Craig Allen Nard, Patent Law's Purposeful Ambiguity, 87 TENN. L. REV. 187 (2019).
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infringements and tailoring the remedies available for each category according to the
infringing users’ intentions and degree of culpability. Moreover, I conclude that the
provided analysis could benefit the Egyptian copyright system. I propose reforming the
Egyptian copyright system by introducing new copyright infringement categories. Such
reforms will remove the threat users are facing when using already existing works as a
material to produce new creations.
I start chapter II by looking into the arguments around the copyright protection itself.
I explain how copyright subject matters are perceived as public goods and how this problem
is addressed by economists. I then underline the theories behind copyright protection,
Afterwards, I end the chapter with explaining two opposing arguments in the literature:
arguments in favor of a strong copyright protection system against arguments in favor of a
flexible copyright system that allows more access to knowledge and freedom in creation.
In chapter III, I analyze the problems that limit the wide access to copyrighted works,
namely the problem of orphan works, and other problems related to the ambiguity of the
copyright system and misinterpretation of some of its terms.
In Chapter IV, I argue that a more flexible copyright system is better to achieve the
goals of copyright. I start by analyzing the application of the fair use doctrine in the US and
other similar doctrines in other countries. I then analyze the US case law including fair use
justification and point out the inconsistency of court decisions in establishing fair use
justification and applying remedies to cases involving fair use defense. Finally, I finish the
chapter by discussing the various calls for expanding the application of fair use. Afterwards,
I point out that developing the doctrine of fair use through creating certain measuring criteria
that determines if the use is fair or not is not the most preferable reform of the copyright
system as it will fail to cope with technological progress and include its unforeseen
innovations.
In the last chapter, I discuss the structure of both copyright infringement system as
well as the available remedies, while emphasizing on the main features of both structures.
Then I move to the impact of this structure on courts decisions, which lead to rendering
8

excessive and inconsistent decisions in disputes involving copyright that accordingly create
anxiety for users to decide to refer to or use existing copyrightable work in their new
creations. As such, I propose certain reforms as a solution to the copyright problems, which
should contribute to incentivizing creativity. I divide the proposed reforms into two groups.
The first group addresses reforms to a specific single copyright problem (i.e., fair use,
personalizing copyright protection, and orphan works). The second group addresses
mitigation of boarder copyright problems without focusing on one specific problem. This
is, as I suggest, needs to be carried out by reforming either the infringement or the remedies
structure. In this part, I discuss a proposal to reform statutory damages structure and another
proposal to reclassify the infringement structure itself and, accordingly, the available
damages.
Based on the above, I conclude that the last proposed reform, which suggests
reclassifying the infringement structure and available remedies, is most suitable method of
reform. I however add to this reform proposal certain recommendations, which covers the
problem of orphan works and suggest removing the statutory damages from willful
infringers in plausible fair use cases to encourage innovators to build on existing works and
produce new creations. Moreover, I finally suggest applying the same proposed method of
reform to the Egyptian copyright legislation with some alternations that would comply with
Egyptian legal system’s nature and structure.
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II.

Arguments Around Copyright Protection
The arguments around copyright protection are plentiful. This is a result of the close

connection between, and the impact of, intellectual property rights in general and copyright
in precise, on economics as well as their direct affiliation with innovation, technology and
development. Today information or data became a tradable commodity in itself. Peer to
Peer networks (“P2P”) became an essential part of our daily business and personal lives.
P2P networks can be easily explained as networks that are established through direct
connections between end user computers for the purpose of file exchange between peers.28
Thus, as much as technology is essential in our daily lives and everything around us revolves
around it, it has numerous functions, on which some of such functions circumvents
copyright protection, which explains the affiliation between technology and copyright.
Accordingly, the importance of copyright must be understood in the context of
copyright theory, which displays the arguments around why copyright should exist and to
what extent should its scope and limits be. Underlining the theories is of great importance
because it allows for a constructive evaluation of the law and system. This is because
lawmakers frequently rely on policy arguments during drafting the law. In addition, due to
the ambiguity of copyright system, as will further be explained, lawyers tend to deploy
policy arguments embedded in these theories in disputes involving copyright
infringement.29 There are four theories that justifies copyright protection. First, the fairness
theory which is based on the idea that hard work should be compensated. Thus, authors who
made effort and used labor to produce and express their ideas should control and benefit
their creations.30Second, is the personality theory, which focuses on protecting the bond
between authors and their creations. According to this theory artistic creations are
considered as the author’s children, and thus, it is necessary to protect their moral integrity
through inserting copyright in their creations.31 Third is the welfare theory that aims to
28

Roger Gachago, The Effect of Technology on Copyright, University of Cape Town, June 2011.
Marc Pelteret, CopyrightX: Lecture Transcripts 343, at 26.
30
Theories of copyright | Copyright Corner, https://library.osu.edu/site/copyright/2014/05/09/theories-ofcopyright/.
31
Id.
29
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achieve greater good for the larger group.32 The fourth theory is the culture one which aims
to foster the culture of the society.33
In this context, there are two core arguments in the literature with opposing effects.
The first argues that a strong copyright system can stimulate development and trade by
providing incentives for individuals and firms to create the goods and services protected by
copyright. The second argument, on the other hand, of the view that strong copyrights can
negatively affect development and trade by conferring disproportionate monopoly power to
the owner of the right or by reducing access to copyrighted materials; this is since copyrights
laws does not only reach counterfeits, but also reaches innovators of creative works built
upon already existing ones.34 Both opposing arguments strive to reach the same outcome
which is a better proposal for a copyright system that properly considers the problems of
copyrights and offers a productive solution that supports stimulating creativity and
innovation to enrich the culture and economy of countries.
Accordingly, this chapter will first look at the two most famous theories underlying
copyright protection. I will first explain how copyrighted products are perceived as public
goods and the public goods problem in the lens of economy, followed by reciting the welfare
and cultural theories of copyrights. I close with discussing the two opposing views of having
a strong copyright system versus a weaker or more flexible copyright system, and the impact
of each on the copyright goals to incentivize creativity.
A. Copyright Subject Matters and Public Goods Problem
Copyright’s subject matters are perceived as public goods and are under threat of being
underproduced if the government did not intervene to incentivize their production. This is
reflected in the definition of public goods, as explained by Harvard University Professor of

32

See Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, Indiana Journal of Global
Legal Studies, Fall, 1999, Vol.7, No.1, at 117-189.
33
Id.
34
Pamela J. Smith, Omar B. Da’ar, Kevin H. Monroe, Fabricio X. Nunez, and Charlotte J. Tuttle, How Do
Copyrights Affect Economic Development and International Trade?, The Journal of World Intellectual
Property (2009) Vol. 12, no. 3, at 198–218.
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Economics Stefanie Stantcheva, can be defined as: “Goods that are perfectly non-rival in
consumption and are non-excludable.” 35 Non-rival in consumption means that one
individual’s consumption of a good does not affect another individual’s consumption to the
same good. While, non-excludable means individuals cannot deny each other the
opportunity to consume this good.36 The classic example of a public good, as stated by
Professor William Fisher of Harvard Law School, is lighthouse which gives a warning to
ships from the existence of rocks to avoid crashing. The benefit that one ship receives from
the light house does not affect or preclude the benefit of other ships. In addition, it would
be difficult to control or exclude the use of a certain number of ships to the lighthouse, or
to exclusively grant this use to a certain ship.37
This example is of a great relevance in the system of copyrights protection. The use of
a copyrighted work does not restrict its use by others. The nature of copyright’s subject
matters drives individuals to spread them, in addition to the vast technological development
that makes it easy to reproduce, transfer, and share copies of the work. Public goods in
general, and copyright in particular, are characterized by two distinct features: firstly, they
have huge social benefits, and secondly, they are likely to be underproduced if not
incentivized through additional stimulations.38
Accordingly, to adopt the public good aspect in copyright, a copyright grants original
authors exclusive property rights to their creations, which entitles them with a sort of
monopoly controlling the use of their created work, to be able to exclude others from
copying their work without obtaining their consent. This sort of monopoly is granted by
copyright law to overcome the public good aspect of copyright’s subject matters. 39 The
public good aspect in economies generally entails the existence of a non-rivalrous and non-
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excludable product, that is likely to be underproduced due to its public good nature, unless
the government interferes to stimulate its creation. This governmental intervention can be
made through, among other things, enacting law that regulates competition.40
The authors of copyrightable works use their efforts and labor to get their creative
works expressed and published, which after publishing will be subjected to non-rivalrous
consumption at very low cost. If the creative works of such authors were not protected by
the copyright law, the authors will not be able to cover the spent cost. This is because
copyrighted materials have high cost to produce and low marginal cost to reproduce and
distribute.41 The same applies on firms that invest in copyright’s concerned industries. The
copyright law entitles these firms to exclusive monopoly rights that allows them to price the
copyrightable goods over their actual costs which makes the deadweight loss tolerable. This
induces such firms to invest in copyright creative projects. 42 Without granting such
monopoly to authors and firms there will be no incentive to produce more creative works;
nevertheless, this monopoly has its cost on future innovation, as the output of one author is
deemed to be the input of another. 43 The exclusive rights granted to an author through
copyright laws that allows the copyright owner to price his work above the marginal cost,
leads to restricting the use of this issued work in new productions, which leads to the less
production of created works. The end result is a reduced access to the created works, and
thus producing deadweight loss for the society.44
Consequently, there is a pressing need for a balance to be able retain the benefits of the
two sides: the interests and incentives of authors to create and control their creations, and
the interest of public to have access to the created work and less constraints limiting the use
of this work. As Fishmen states: “any exclusive right should be large enough to induce
investment in creativity upstream but not so large that it unnecessarily inhibits creativity
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downstream.” 45 Thus, a better copyright system should consider balancing between the
social and private interests that means balancing between the copyright’s owner interest and
the user of copyrighted work. This has been reflected in the copyright system which has
started developing and introducing exceptions copyright, such as the fair-use and
compulsory licensing doctrines that will be discussed further.

B. Copyright through the Lens of Welfare
In looking at copyright through the lens of welfare it becomes apparent that welfare theory
is inspired by utilitarianism. The utilitarian approach was first introduced in the late 18th
century in the writings of English philosophers and economists, mostly advocating and
inspired by the views of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. 46 Utilitarianism can be
described as a general doctrine of ethics that advocates actions fostering happiness and
pleasure to the greater group and opposes actions causing unhappiness or harm.47 As such,
the core aim of this approach, in the context of social, economic and political decisions, is
to achieve what is better for the whole society.
Utilitarianism is fairly manifested in the economic welfare theory and its views on
copyright protection, which generally perceives that the government and law should be
organized in a way that promotes the greatest amount of happiness to the greater number of
people.48 This, accordingly, means that copyright laws shall be established in a way that
constantly considers the benefits and happiness of the greater group, reflected in the society,
rather than advocating the rights of a certain group of people.
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To explain the relation between copyright protection and societal welfare, professor
William Fisher used the example of a film making company that created a documentary and
produced it on DVD. This film-making company, to be able to make profits, it has to set the
price of the DVD above it marginal cost. If copyright law did not exist, then other companies
will be allowed to make copies of the DVD and sell it with a lower price than the companies
with the original copy. At this point the film-making company will realize that it will have
to lower the cost of the DVD’s original copy to be able to sell; yet, competitors who sell the
same DVD movie would also lower their price, and so forth until the movie falls down the
marginal cost, meaning that it would rarely cover the cost of its production.49
Although this would lead to having more copies produced and distributed to consumers
in a very low price; nevertheless, the film making company will find itself in a deadlock
situation where the production of the documentary does not return any profit to the
company, which will lead accordingly to the stop of production, resulting in depriving the
society form the benefits of such movies. Clearly this situation is harmful for both the
benefits of the producers and consumers as well. This requires a government intervention
to alleviate such situation, which is the purpose of copyright law: to suppress competition
in the production and distribution of copyrightable creative works.50
In the United States, when the legislator amended the Copyright Act and expanded its
scope, the aim was to encompass informational content that was not, at that time, normally
recognized as copyrightable, and which had an effective impact on the US economy
system. 51 The introduction of intellectual property protection in the Uruguay round of
negotiating the TRIPS Agreement sought to mitigate the welfare loss that the country
suffered resulting from intellectual property rights violations that distorted the flow of free
trade and resulted in significant reductions of welfare benefits that countries enjoy on the
basis of free trade.52 The law sought, on one hand, to protect the rights of authors from
49

William Fisher, CopyrightX: Lecture 4.2, Welfare Theory: The Incentive Theory of Copyright (2015), 2:1510:00, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9wqQNCC-Vs.
50
Id.
51
See Ruth Gana Okediji, supra note 32.
52
Id, at 118.

15

piracy and counterfeit activities that constituted a great threat on the trade of intellectual
property, including copyrights, to provide incentives to their authors and creators, and
reduce their welfare loss. On the other hand, the law aimed to protect the rights granted to
authors, which are provided to incentivize creativity.
Thus failure to protect such rights, would reduce the rate of producing these activities,
which would also lead to welfare loss in the form of minimizing creativity and innovation.53
Professor Ruth Okediji argued that the process of globalization created powerful links
between markets, peoples and cultures, which enlarged the existing problems, and requires
more, not less, government intervention to be able to solve this problems.54 She also argued
that intellectual property rights provide incentives for individuals to create and failure to
protect such right retards creativity. Moreover, lack of enforcement, she argues, would lead
to inefficiently and costly strategies to protect innovations, while eliminating the availability
of new information to public.55
The intervention of copyright law, with its objective to stimulate creativity, eliminates
the public good’s problem in copyright and stands as the core economic justification of the
copyright system to enhance the public welfare. In this context, to ensure the fulfilment of
the copyright system’s welfare goal (by enhancing the public welfare and removing greater
extent of harm to the public), exceptions to copyrights, which are the exclusive rights
granted to authors, are introduced to balance the system and positions it in the direction of
imposing greater welfare to public. Such exceptions evolved clearly in the doctrines of
“first-sale”, “fair use” and “compulsory licenses.” The latter two doctrines will be further
demonstrated in the upcoming chapters. These famous doctrines, that deviates from the free
market model, in the view of welfare advocates, attempt to rectify the weakness existing in
the free trade of copyrights and intellectual property in general.56 This regains the sought
balance and achieved better public welfare results.
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C. Copyright in the Lens of Culture
Unlike the welfare theory, which is concerned with achieving the better for the whole
society through the interference of the government and law in a way that guarantees to
regulate the law to achieve the better results for the larger group. Looking at copyright
through the lens of culture presents a different view.
The roots of culture theory approach can be tracked back to the writings of Karl
Marx in the late 18th century, followed by the writings of social theorists like Max Weber
and Emile Durkheim. Nevertheless, the theory did not start to shine until the mid of the 19th
century. The theory planted its roots in philosophy, political and legal literature. The theory
is based on the idea that humans, because of their nature, either flourish or suffer according
to the conditions existing around them.57 Accordingly, social, political and legal institutions
should facilitate the conditions surrounding individuals to be able to flourish. The theory
lists eight conditions that are essential for individuals, or are perceived as the components
needed for individuals, to fully realize their personhood and accordingly start flourishing.
These conditions are, as listed by Professor William Fisher: life, health autonomy,
engagement, self-expression, competence, connection and privacy. 58 Worth noting that
these conditions are` the fundamental human rights guaranteed by human right conventions.
In this section I will focus on elaborating how copyrights are conceived from cultural
perspective, and the impact of such perception on copyright.
Scholars defending the cultural approach have various disagreements among
themselves and adopt this approach variously. Despite such disagreement, advocates of
cultural approach, generally, perceives that copyright shall, as any other field of law, be
organized in a way that facilitates and sustains a just and attractive culture.59 This can be
reflected in a legal framework that encourages individuals to act in certain ways which help
in realizing a more attractive society and future. The advocates of this theory prioritize
57
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human freedoms in general, and freedom of expressions in particular, as one of the essential
elements that drives the society to flourish. However, those same advocates believe that
“people are not always the best judges for their own interests”60; accordingly, the law needs
to intervene to regulate the direction for individuals to follow. Those advocates arguments
aim to ensure that all individuals are granted fair shares of resources, as well as fair access
to opportunities necessary for humans to flourish.
According to advocates of the culture approach, self-autonomy is considered an
essential element to flourish. Ultimate degree of autonomy is impossible to achieve;
however, it is essential to reach a substantial degree, as higher levels of autonomy enriches
the culture. As such, from a copyright perspective, the concept of creative autonomy is
essential for the production of more quantity and better varieties of creative works. 61
According to Mary Gani-Ikilama, when justifying the creative autonomy theory, John
Locke, the English philosopher, reflected on the importance of ensuring that the remining
resources for the public, after appropriation, are sufficient in quality and quantity, to be
easily utilized by others in the society. Moreover, individuals shall not be allowed to exhaust
resources more than they could use to avoid wastage.62
In the context of copyright and the effect of the cultural thoughts on it, it is important
to explicate the basis of which some of the cultural approach advocates relies on in justifying
copyright. Freedom of expression is a fundamental right affiliated to humans, advocated
and guaranteed by every human rights convention or state’s constitution, including the
freedom to choose the method of such expression.63 The European Court of Human Rights
underlines, in many of its decision, the importance of the concept of artistic expression in
the context of freedom of expression, 64 as well as the principle of proportionality that entails
“striking a balance between freedom of expression and property right.”65 Article 15 of the
60
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also recognized the
individual’s right to participate in cultural life activities, enjoy benefits of scientific
progress, as well as, benefiting from protection of moral and material interests of their
created scientific, literary, or artistic productions.66 According to the above and based on
the underlying argument of the cultural theory, the supporters of this theory interpret
creative work as a mean of freedom of expression and perceives copyright as an exception
to the right of freedom of expression and they accordingly call for limiting such exception,
as much as possible, to allow humans to flourish. Thus, it can be concluded, as explained
above, that the cultural theory advocates do not call for eliminating copyright protection,
they rather advocate for restricting copyrights to allow more freedom of expression and
ensure wide access to fair quality and quantity of cultural work.
D. Strong Copyright Protection against More Flexible Copyright
Protection Arguments
It is clear that literature comprises two opposing arguments in copyright’s system, as
previously articulated, those who support having a strong copyright system against who
support having a flexible copyright system. In this section I will discuss the base of both
arguments and reflect on some of the grounding ideas found in each of the arguments.
To call for having a strong copyright system scholars had to base their opinion on
strong arguments. One of the ideas adopted by scholars who argue for a stronger copyright
system is that limitations and constraints on copyright are essential to push individuals to
the edge of their innovation, by limiting their choices, which leads to producing better
creative expressions. This leads to logically adopting the concept of the “idea/expression”
defense, which entails that copyright protects only creative expressions and not ideas. This
leaves authors, with plenty of ideas available in public, through which they can utilize any
to produce one’s creative expression, only then, this expression shall be copyrightable.
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In this context, multiple justifications were offered by supporters of this view. One
of such justifications included relying on an experimental study made on two groups of
peoples for the innovation of software coding design. The group who were restricted from
access to the work of the other group, came up with better innovative idea, than the other
group, who were permitted to access what the competing group reached and built up on
their work.67
In addition, couple of situations were cited by Fishman, in which constraints
turned out to work in favor of innovation and creativity,68 from which, is the track “All Falls
Down” which was recorded by Kanye West when they failed to obtain a music sample
license. Another example is the track resulting used by David Newhoff in a film scene “All
Falls Down”, which he decided to use after failure to obtain a license of the Shirelles’
“Tonight’s the Night” which he aimed for at the first place. 69 According to Fishman,
Newhoff thought that he movie ended up with a better track because he was forced to search
more for another alternative.70 Nevertheless, such pleasant outcome is not of a frequent
occurrence, because; on one hand, in both mentioned situations the film-makers, who are in
the position of users of copyrighted works, refrained at all from using the desired track and
shifted for the use of another, which fortunately in their situation turned out to be good. Yet,
this result is not guaranteed, and the end result of each of those situations is that film-makers
were deprived from the use of an existing work. On the other hand, in incidents were users
fail to obtain a license to use and build up on existing protected work, they mostly refrain
from the use of such work, which ends up loss of creative productions, or could unlikely
choose to use the work without obtaining the license, which exposes them to the risk of
being disputed before courts and likely if found infringers, they will be subjected to a huge
amount of damages, as will be further illustrated in chapter four.
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The opposing side of this Argument calls for having a flexible copyright system,
based on the fact that creators will be deprived from their freedom of expression if they
wished to express an idea related to a protected work. Thus, complying with copyright law
restrictions, will not intrinsically incentivize innovators. Such restrictions would rather hold
them back from expressing their ideas. In this context, the end result will be depriving the
society from significant cultural activities and ideas.
Doctrines introducing exceptions to copyrights are adopted to limit the monopoly
granted by copyright, that is essential to foster the culture of the society. Supporters of this
view calls for a wide interpretation for such doctrines to achieve the required freedom that
motivates creator of innovate, without limitations, and express their innovations. It is
important to differentiate between imitating and transforming an existing work to a new
creative one. The supporters of this view do not call for the exclusion of copyright or the
encouragement of mere copying and imitating, on the contrary, they are aware of the
importance of copyright and the certain monopoly conveyed to authors to provoke the
production of creative works. They are calling for the introduction and wide interpretation
of copyright exceptions, to allow other to build on the existing work.
In this context, it is important to emphasize the importance of exceptions to
copyright such as the famous fair use, compulsory licenses, first sale, idea/expression, and
other doctrines. Those doctrines are indeed essential to fostering the society, and without
them the society would have lost countless opportunities in the production of creative work.
A clear example illustrating this outcome; the loss that would have been suffered by the
society, is the assumption of exclusion of fair use doctrine, in the well know Betamax case
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (“Betamax Case”).71 In this case,
Sony provided for the first time the VCR machines, which allowed consumers to videotape
television broadcast and replay them later with the option of fast-forwarding to skip
commercials. 72 This situation disturbed the advertisement business and in turn the business
71
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of the network and the studios, which depended on earning money from licenses issued in
the process of enabling television networks to eventually broadcast movies, that are
copyrighted, to consumers, without any breach in copyright law. 73 Universal Studios
brought a contributory infringement claim against Sony for manufacturing the machine
used by consumers to make verbatim copies of their protected and owned work without
authorization. The court eventually ruled in favor of Sony and justified their use under the
fair use doctrine based of the fact that time shifting is a common use of the VCR machine
and that the machine was capable of substantial non-infringing use.74
Without this justification provided under the scope of fair use, the court would
have ruled that a copyright infringement occurred, since actual verbatim copying occurred
without obtaining a license. This would have locked the court in a closed circle, where the
court would have no room to allow for exceptions, and accordingly would have awarded
the Universal Studios a compensation in addition to injunctive relief, which could have
resulted in the cease of producing the VCR machines. This outcome would have resulted in
a clear loss to the society by depriving it from such a creative product that is today a
normally used home entertainment and is heavily relied on by consumers to enable them to
conveniently watch later anything they have missed.
Hence, the mentioned example clearly shows the importance of copyright
exceptions and the gains of easing, in certain occasions, some of its constraints. On the other
hand, it has been clearly demonstrated that some of the constraints introduced by copyright
are vital and needed to ensure the continuing production of copyrightable works. Scholars
today are aware of the importance of both copyright constraints and exceptions. The
challenge exists in finding the balancing point of imposing a strong copyright system, that
help in incentivizing creation and innovation, as well as removing the obstacles that hurt the
process. This will be attainable by protecting the right of such creators, while at the same
73
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time offering the freedom to create and safeguarding their work from any future risk
exposure to claims against their creations.
Based on the earlier arguments around copyright system and its significant effect on
the stimulation of creativity and innovation, I have demonstrated the importance of
allowing innovators to have a wide access to created works, and the ability to use and build
on existing works. The supporters for both arguments (strong copyright system against a
flexible one) acknowledge the necessity of allowing users to build on already existing
work, to help flourishing culture in the society.
III.

Limitations on Wide Access to Works

Limitations on wide access to work restrict the freedom of innovators to use existent work
as a material for producing new creative works. Considering the long term of copyright
which lasts in the United States for 75 years after the death of the author, if users are
restricted to use the existing copyrighted works in their creations this will obstruct the
process of creation and innovation. Thus, the cost of such restriction on innovation
outweighs its benefits for the copyright owner. Accordingly, obstacles hindering the access
and authorization of the use of copyrighted work in new creations shall be managed wisely
so as not to impair the creation process. For this reason, debates around adopting strong or
weak copyright system arose.
In this Chapter, I will discuss two main problems that limit users from having a wide
expansive access to created works, as well the freedom to use this work in producing other
creations. I will focus on discussing two specific existing problems which exacerbates the
process of creation, and hinders building on the existing works. I will not refer to the more
generic problems of copyright law that limits, as well, the mentioned creation process.
First, I will discuss the orphan works problem and its impact on creativity and innovation.
Then, I will discuss the problem of the ambiguity of some terms of the copyright law and
scope of license, which has direct effect on the users’ choice to proceed with their creations.
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A. The Problem of Orphan Works
When considering the problems limiting users wide access to created works, the problem
of orphans works limits to a great extent users’ availability to seek licenses and use the
created orphaned works.
1. Definition and Impact
In terms of its definition, there is no unified definition of orphan works; however, each
definition proposed by scholars entails the existence of a copyrightable work that does not
include any information which could lead to the identity or location of its owner, even
when a profound due diligence search is made to identify or locate this owner.
This leaves the users in a deadlock situation, where they are uncertain whether the
work is still under protection or in the public domain, and, accordingly, they cannot obtain
licenses to use this work and benefit from it. Thus, the users are left with two tough
alternatives: either to choose relinquishing the use of the orphan work, or to use the work
and incur the risk of reappearance of the copyright holder. In such case the copyright
holder will then be entitled to claim copyright infringement damages available at law.
This will likely minimize the appetite to use such works as an input for new creations.
Undoubtedly, the end result of this situation is depriving the society from the opportunity
to benefit from the potential creative works that would have been produced if the users
were able to locate the copyright owners or to obtain licenses to the use of such works. As
such, orphan works can be defined as “copyrighted works whose owners are difficult or
impossible to identify and/or locate after a diligent search has been conducted.”75 This
includes books, photographs, movies and other types of works.76
This orphan works problem hardly existed before the adoption of the “formality
free” obligation by international conventions and practice, specifically the Berne
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Convention77; which imposed obligation on all parties to remove any legal formalities to
acquire copyright. This changed the copyright system from an “opt in” to “opt out”
system, where innovators obtain copyrights upon expressing their ideas once articulated
in a tangible medium without any need to take any formal procedures to register this
copyright.78 The problem became more apparent after the “Google Book Search” and the
“HalthiTrust” digital library cases, where both were attempting to launch digital libraries.
HathiTrust was an organization formed by universities to operate a digital library. 79
Google Books was also a project of digital library including data base of allowing
individuals to search through millions of books and read selected passages.80 Both were
litigated for attempting to collect digital books, by scanning the books and uploading them
without obtaining license, which made them address problem of orphan works on a larger
scale.81
Aside from the exemption of Google on the basis of the adoption of fair use
doctrine, the problem of digital libraries relies on existing numbers of orphan works,
which is proved to be very challenging for organizations in the process of librarying that
includes millions of books, photos and other copyrightable work. The US copyright law
entails the copyright holder, who may at any time reappear and claim ownership of the
orphaned work, to claim injunctive reliefs and monetary damages that could reach up to
$150,000 per infringed work. Accordingly, organizations, to avoid such damages that
could easily lead to their bankruptcy, often incline towards removing these orphaned
works from their collection, which is perceived as a culture loss to the society.82
Orphan Works problem is not limited to books and libraries, it also limits the ability
of users to create derivative works out of the orphaned one, which limits the production
of motion pictures, films, songs, and other creative innovations that enriches the culture.
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The famous Middle East Iraqi singer Kazem Al-Saher stated that it took him five
years of searching to find the owner of the poem “I and Leila” which he wished to sing.
He also stated that, in the process of searching, various people alleged its ownership, but
none of them was able to provide the whole versus of the poem. This could have easily
lead Al-Saher to mistakenly obtain a license form a non-owner, and expose himself to the
risk of being litigated.83 On the other hand, if AL-Saher did not successfully reach the
author of the poem, he would have not performed one of the most famous songs in the
Middle East.
If users are not able to take the risk and afford the potential liability they may be
exposed to when they use orphan work, their financial incentive to create will be undercut,
and thus, removing the barriers and allowing innovators to use the orphan works will
facilitate the production of variety of creative works in science, humanity, arts, literature,
sound recordings, film making, and several other fields of innovations. 84
2. Suggested Solutions
Based on the orphan works problem and its impact on utilizing copyrighted works,
scholars have been suggesting several proposals to solve this problem. Some of such
proposal revolve around encouraging authors to provide their information on the work
they created. Established digital platforms play important role in this context. For
example, “SACEM” (a platform of the society of music authors, composers, and
publishers) provides services for artists and performers to administer their work as well
as providing services, including obtaining licenses and the collection and distribution of
royalties. This society started in France to manage the French and European authors’
rights, followed by its successor society in the Middle East “SACERAU.”85
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Scholars have been also calling for the promotion of the use of “Creative
Commons”, 86 to regulate the information of authors and licensing process. Creative
Commons is a flexible copyright regime that is provided through a digital platform which
makes available to copyright owners a set of standardized licenses that they can grant to
either public or users that wish to use their work in another creation.87 This process is easy
and wholly digitalized to facilitate the licensing to users and ensure ability to locate
authors. It is necessary to raise awareness on the importance of providing authors’
information to be able to locate them, in addition to supporting the facilitation and
digitalization of making the information available and the issuance of licenses process.
However, this will only mitigate the problem of orphan woks in the future without
providing any mitigation to the current orphan works that are already existing. In addition,
making authors’ information available is not an obligation, as it will be left to their
discretion whether to provide their information or not, it is rather a recommendation.
Another solution that has been suggested for the problem is introducing indemnity
or security to the use of orphan works. This secure the users’ right and indemnifying them
from any future claims that could be brought against them by the copyright holder that
may appear at any time. This can be operated by allowing a private organization to act as
the right holder and collect royalty fees against granting a license for the use of orphan
work. In return, this organization shall indemnify the user, who paid the royalty fee and
is granted a license from any future potential claims that might be brought in case of the
copyright holder appearance.88 This model is applied in Netherlands, where there is a
foundation called Anoniem that is associated to Dutch organization for professional
photographers.89 Users who wish to obtain a license to use any photographs that they
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failed to locate its author, after diligence search is made, revert to Foto Anoniem, which
grants them legal protection through an indemnity clause.90
There is also another suggested proposal that is of great importance. This proposal
suggests including orphan works in the system of compulsory licensing. According to this
system, an administrative authority will be entitled to grant license for the use of orphan
works, after ensuring that an unsuccessful due diligence search has been conducted to
locate the author, according to certain set up criteria. This is already applied in Canada,
Japan, South Korea, and Hungary. 91 However, the United Stated copyright office has
rejected this system, on the basis that it is an insufficient system, because it requires every
user to make payment, and in most of the cases the unidentified author will likely not
appear.92 Moreover, economists criticized this system, because it is based on pre-payment
or ex ante payment of licensing fees, which would likely lead to overpricing. The rationale
behind such critique is that the economic value of the use of orphaned work appears after
the use takes place, and the license fees should be determined according to this economic
value.93 However, this is refuted by proposing to offer a discounted license, which would
easily overcome the fear of overpricing.
Finally, a proposal has been suggested to limit the remedies available for the
reappearing holders of the right. The United States Copyright office previously suggested
the introduction of a statutory limitation on remedies available to reappearing authors
against the users of their orphaned work, after a reasonably diligent search has been
conducted in good faith to locate the user without success. This proposal suggested to
include the commercial use in the scope of the limitation, which differentiates this
exception from the fair use exception, the will be discussed in chapter III. The suggested
proposal also includes limiting the scope of available injunctions. By introducing this
exception, that covers commercial and non-commercial use of orphan works, and limiting
the injunctions, innovators will be incentivized to produce derivative works to the orphan

90

Id.
Hansen, David R., Kathryn Hashimoto, Gwen Hinze, supra note 76, at 39.
92
Id, at 40.
93
Stef van Gompel & P. Bernt Hugenholt, supra note 88.
91

28

works, which will enrich culture in the society. This requires a clear, unambiguous and
balanced system that regulates and defines what is an orphan work and what can be
considered as a good faith diligent search.
B. The Ambiguity of the System
The second problem that impacts the use of existing copyrighted works in new creations in
a way that drive users towards the refrain from using these works, is the ambiguity of the
copyright system. This is because users fear that they may misinterpret the system and their
use turns to be infringing and thus exposing them to the risk of being disputed and subjected
to huge and excessive damages.
It is well established among scholars that the copyright system, especially that of
the United States, comprises very notable ambiguity and vagueness regarding the
interpretations of its terms. This is well articulated in Bell and Parchomovsky’s literature
in which they affirm that “Copyright doctrine contains a high degree of uncertainty. It is
easy for potential users of a work to mistakenly infringe due to misunderstandings about
the legal protections afforded to works or the facts surrounding the work.”94 They both
argued, as well as other scholars, that users frequently make mistakes because of the
ambiguity of the copyright system.
1. Copyright Subject Matters
Copyright grants authors of original created works exclusive monopoly rights over
their creations. Nevertheless, it is not easy to determine what constitutes a copyrightable
work and what does not, or whether a work is considered original creation or not; and,
eventually, whether a borrowed existing idea that is transformed to new expression has
just imitated an existing work, and so forth. For instance, although the US Copyright Act
includes eight subjects matters of creative works that are copyrightable; it also states that
copyright protection subsists in any type of original work, currently known or developed
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in the future, that is originally created and expressed through a tangible medium.95 Users
are still arguing on some matters to be expanded under copyright protection, such as the
creation of mems, tattoos, the design of flower garden, fashion, etc.
2. Limits of Protection
Moreover, the scope and limits of protection of copyrighted works are not clear,
which often lead users to fall into mistakes and find themselves guilty of copyright
infringement. This was clear in the case Three Boys Music Corporation v. Bolton,96where
Bolton issued a song titled “Love is a Wonderful Thing”, which had the same title used
by Three Boys Music for a track released in 1991. Despite the similarity of both titles, it
turned out, at the time of the suit, that 129 songs were registered under the same name.97
Nevertheless, the court rendered Bolton guilty with copyright infringement based on the
jury’s decision which found that Bolton had access to the plaintiff’s owned copyright and
both titles were substantially similar. The court awarded Three Boys Music Corporation
$5.4 Million damages.98
3. Unpredictability of the Outcome
Since predictability is one of the fundamental elements of any legal system, it is
important to underline the lack of such element in copyright. It is hard for users to predict
what constitutes an infringement and how does courts demonstrate the occurrence of
infringement, mainly because the case law seems to be inconsistent in this matter. Warner
Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting 99 case clearly illustrates the confusion users
might fall into when determining the extent of the use of copyrighted work. In this case
the authors of a serial novel “The Maltese Falcon” transferred the copyright of television,
radio and movie of the novel to Warner Brother, who accordingly published different
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movies of the novel. The novel’s main character was detective Sam Spade. The Author
later granted an exclusive right to the use of the character Sam Spade and other characters
included in the novel to Columbia Broadcasting. Such authorization resulted in a radio
show titled The Adventures of Sam Spade. Warner brothers brought copyright
infringement claim against the Author alleging that he was not entitled to grant such
authorization to Columbia Broadcasting, since the rights of the novel were already
transferred to Warner Brother. The US Court of Appeal found that the Sam Spade
character is not copyrightable and ruled in favor of the Author stating, “if the character is
only the chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of protection
afforded by copyright.”100
Another interesting opinion that reflect the inconsistency in case law is the
Anderson v. Stallone101, involving characters of the Rocky series of movies. In this case,
Anderson – a fan of Sylvester Stallone – wrote a scene and presented it to the movie
executives; including an idea of a fight in Moscow between Stallone and a Soviet officer.
Anderson alleged that movie Rocky IV infringed his right and copied the scene he
presented to the executives. The Court of Appeal ruled in favor of Stallone on the basis
that Rocky characters are copyrightable and Anderson’s scene was unauthorized
derivative work using, illegally, Stallone’s characters.102 In its ruling the court stated, “the
Rocky Characters were so highly developed and central to the three movies made before
Anderson’s treatment….and were, therefore, entitled to copyright protection.”103
The above two cases illustrate well the inconsistency of courts’ decisions, as well
as the ambiguity of law in determining the scope and extent of copyright protection. This
makes the copyright system unpredictable to users, which accordingly drives them to fall
into mistakes of misinterpreting the laws or the facts surrounding the use of work. Thus,
leaving them constantly exposed to the risk of being dragged to court in a copy right
infringement claim. Moreover, this creates a depressing atmosphere for creators that
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restricts their ability and freedom to innovate, which eventually leads to exacerbating the
problems impeding the process of creativity and innovation, and impedes its flourishment.
4. Interpretations of Authorizations
Lastly, even if an authorization to use the work is obtained, a user might easily fall
into the mistake of speculating the scope of the authorizing licenses, like the case of
Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishing Ltd. v. The Walt Disney Co.104 In this case, Boosey
issued a license to Walt Disney authorizing the use and distribution of “The Rite of
Spring” music composition which features Fantasia the Walt Disney Movie. Walt Disney
distributed the Movie that includes the motion picture and the music composition owned
by Boosey in a video format. Boosey brought an infringement claim against Walt Disney
alleging that the license did not include authorizing the video format release of the motion
picture. The Court ruled against Walt Disney and established that the distribution of the
video format indeed exceed the limits of the granted license.105
It is clear from above case law that there is unclarity and uncertainty in the copyright
system in a way that affects directly the users and make it difficult for them to predict the
legality of the use of copyrighted works. It is for those reasons and others – which will be
illustrated in the following chapters – beside considering the significance of the
predictability element in the legal system, it is vital to introduce to the copyright system
measures that would alleviate this uncertainty and empower creators to use existing work
and express their innovation without fear of encumbering legal liability.
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IV.

More Flexible Copyright Protection and more Application of Fair Use
I have discussed in chapters one and two how imposing more restrictions and

constraints on copyright could negatively affect the process of creativity. This restrains
users from producing more creative works, fearing the tragic outcome of being dragged to
courts in a copyright infringement claim. Courts’ decisions, in such infringement claims,
are not always predicable and would likely lead to the awards of excessive damages, which
are generally hard borne for users. For these reasons, and to encourage the process of
creation, the notion of exceptions to copyright has been introduced, including the famous
“fair use” doctrine. In this chapter I will start by discussing the fair use doctrine and its
adoption in the United Stated, as well as briefly exploring the adoption of similar doctrines
in other countries. I will then analyze the courts’ approach when alleged defense of fair use
is invoked in the context of the impact of such decision on motivating freedom of creativity
and innovation. Finally, in the last section, I will underline the scholarly calls for
development of the fair use doctrine.
A. Fair Use:
The Concept of fair use entails the restricted permission of using copyrighted works in
certain contexts that are considered fair. It emerged in the beginning of the 18th century in
the English Law, and was first introduced in the United States through the US Supreme
Court decision in the Folsom v. Marsh 106 case. In the said case, the plaintiff claimed
infringing his copyright by the defendant who published letters of the former president
George Washington. The court held that despite some activities are inconsistent with the
copyright statue, they do not give rise to liability because they constitute “Justifiable uses”
or “Bona fide abridgments.”107 Followed by this decision, courts have been utilizing fair use
defense in many cases, and, by the 20th century, courts started referring to fair use as a
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distinct legal issue. The fair use remained as a judge made doctrine, which was developed
solely by courts, until it was codified under Section 107 of the 1979 Copyright Act.108
1. Fair User Under the US Copyright Act
Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act laid down the fair use exception to
copyrighted works, including the use by reproduction, phonorecords, or any other mean
specified in that section, for the purpose of criticism, comment, news, reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research.109 The statue added that there are certain factors that shall be
considered when determining whether a use is fair or not. Such factors include: a) the
purpose and character of the use, whether the use is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; b) the nature of copyrighted work; c) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as whole; and d) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for value of the copyrighted work.110 The
language of the statute is clear in listing those factors as non-exhaustive factors.
Moreover, the language is clear that fair use is applied on all the exclusive rights
granted to the copyright owner, including the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”).111 It
is important to note that the statue did not provide any criteria for the courts to follow in
assessing those four factors, and which of such factors shall weight more. Hence, fair use
is considered a judge made doctrine, that is decided on ad hoc basis, considering the
circumstances surrounding each case separately. For this reason, judges have been
interpreting and applying the fair use differently, which led to inconsistency in the case
law invoking fair use that will be further illustrated in this Chapter.
2. Fair Use in Other Countries
Developed countries other than the United Stated who does not adopt the fair use
doctrine adopt other legal doctrines that are similar to the fair use. This includes the fair
108

Id.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2012), Section 107.
110
William Fisher, supra note 107.
111
Id.
109

34

dealing doctrine adopted by the English and Canadian legal systems. The Supreme Court
of Canada for instance, in its decision in Society of Composers, Authors, and Music
Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canda 112 decided that the music previews provided for
consumers through stream services before purchasing certain music, such as Apple’s
iTunes service, is considered a fair dealing for the purpose of search.113
In the United Kingdom, fair dealing was demonstrated in the British Broadcasting
Corp v. British Satellite Broadcasting Ltd., where the two companies, BBC and BSB,
disputed over BSB’s use of highlights from BBC’s exclusive coverage of the World Cup
finals tournament.114 The court held that broadcasts were brought within the general set
of fair dealing defenses.115 Moreover, The Court of Appeal, in the Pro Sieben Media AG
v. Carlton Telivision Ltd., considered the practice of copying off air other broadcaster’s
programs as fair dealing.116
The role fair use or fair dealing doctrines play in limiting the constraint of copyright
is of great importance in the realm of incentivizing creativity. Thus, scholars have been
calling for the development of these doctrines in the direction of expanding their
interpretation, removing the ambiguity of their application as well as setting clear criteria
and measures of such application, and limiting the constraint of copyright to help in
incentivizing innovation and creativity.
B. Underlying Case Law and Existing Inconsistency:
The call to expand the interpretation and application of the fair use doctrine is
grounded in the need for allowing more freedom and space for users to innovate new
ideas, technologies and services that would contribute to the welfare and culture of the
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society. If the production of such ideas and innovations is restricted, it would result in a
significant loss to the society. For Instance, the Google Books project has made a
significant contribution to the society and culture117 by gathering books from all over the
world in one digital library and facilitating the process of searching. One can imagine if
Google’s activities in this project were not justified under the fair use doctrine, Google
would have been subjected not only to very excessive compensational award, but also
injunctive relief, which could have resulted in stopping of the project. This could lead to
catastrophic loss for the society in terms of culture and welfare.
This is argument is clearly demonstrated in A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc.,
Case (“Napster Case”).118 Napster was a software application that allowed users to time
shift and exchange copies of music recording through file sharing, in a model that is very
familiar nowadays and similar to the time shifting model relied on in the Betamax Case.
Following the rational of the court’s decision in the Betamax Case119, where the court
justified the copying act of Sony through VCR machines as fair use, Napster anticipated
that same outcome for the similarity between the activities involved in both cases.
Nevertheless, the United Stated Court of Appeal found that Napster did not meet the
criteria of fair use on the ground that the behavior of Napster individuals is commercial
in nature, even though Napster did not take any money in exchange, they were involved
in a behavior that avoids paying money.120
Napster was not the only corporation who was misled by its misinterpretation of
fair use, Aereo also unsuccessfully anticipated its copying activities to fall within the fair
use, assuming that they could base their fair use argument on similar arguments used in
the Google Books and Betamax cases. The similarity between the facts revolving around
Betamax Case and Aereo is striking. Aereo used to sell a service that allowed its
subscribers to watch television programs over the internet at the same time that the
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programs are broadcast over the air.121 Also, Aereo provided another time shifting service
for programs, allowing the users to record the program and watch it in another time.122
Aereo assumed that their copying is justified under fair use. 123 Nevertheless, the US
Supreme Court disagreed on the basis that Aereo’s business was similar to the cable
television service, regardless of the fact of how actual transmission was provided.124 This
decision raised scholars’ concerns because of its impact on the cloud storage services.
Scholars believed that services like Google Music and Dropbox that also transmit
copyrighted content to users, were justified on the same basis of justification adopted in
the Betamax case. Now, the court’s decision in American Broadcasting Cos., INC., v.
Aereo, INC., (“Aereo’s Case”) casted a threat on such cloud storing services because
they operate the same way Aereo operated.125 Scholars, as well as dissent opinion pointed
out a significant problem in Aereo’s case: that the court did not provide in its opinion any
clear criteria on the fact that Aereo’s model was similar to that of cable television, which
was one of the core facts that the court relied its decision.126

1. More Inconsistent Fair Use Court Decisions
Another example of the inconsistency in case law on fair use is seen in the contradicting
decisions of three court in cases that involved very similar acts of use. First, the Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (“Campbell’s case”),127 where a rap group called 2 Live Crew
unsuccessfully sought to obtain a license from the music owner of Pretty Woman’s song
composition. Despite failure to obtain license, 2 Live Crew produced and published a
parody to the song. The court ruled in favor of 2 Live Crew justifying their copying as
fair use. The court stated that the music composition published by 2 Live Crew
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(2018),

constituted a parody to the Pretty Women’s composition and added that “parody is an
obvious claim to transformative value.”128
The second comparable case is Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P., v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc.129, where the defendants published “The Cat NOT in the Hat”, a parody book of the
O.J. Simpson Trial. The defendants assumed that their copying is justified under fair use
based on its transformative nature. Yet, the court disagreed, and ruled that the defendants
used materials in a style not favored by fair use doctrine.130
The third case which manifests the paradox in deciding on fair use argument, is the
Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc. In this case, Mr. Seltzer was the owner of a poster of a
Shrieking Woman’s face “a la Munch” a poster that publicly spread in Los Angeles. The
defendant, Green Day, used in the background of one of his songs a transformative
version on the poster. The Court of Appeal demonstrated that Green Day’s act of copying
justified under fair use, on the basis that the purpose and character of the use was
transformative, because “the video altered the expressive content or message of the
illustration.” 131 These three cases demonstrate the existing unclarity and lack of
determinative criteria on the application of fair use doctrine that lead to different
outcomes in very similar cases.
Moreover, the court’s decision in the Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc., v. Carol
Publ. Group (“Trivia Book Case”)132 mirrors confusion in the interpretation of fair use,
and the overlap between two main concepts; parody or creating a transformative work
out of the existing work and producing a derivative work. In the Trivia Book case, the
defendant published a book of trivia questions about the events and characters of Seinfeld
television series.133 The court found that the use was not justified under fair use and that
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it affected the copyright owner’s right to make derivative work out of Seinfeld in the
form of Trivia Books.134
Another interesting decision, in the Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. RDR
Books, 135 where the court found that there is transformation in the work, yet it ruled that
the use was not fair. In this case, the defendant planned to publish Harry Potter
encyclopedia that includes people, places and things from the Harry Potter novel. In its
ruling, the court held that the work is indeed transformative in character; however, the
significance of this transformative nature is diminished because of the verbatim copying
of some of the entries from the novel. Thus, the court ruled that the use is not fair.136
In another decision which its fair use arguments were plausible, the court decided
$1 Million damages to the plaintiff. In the L.A. Times v. Free Republic, the defendant
Free Republic owned a website where the members used to post newspapers published
articles and add remarks or commentaries for other users of the website, who as well read
the commentaries and also added their comments. 137 The court based its decision in
denying the fair use justification on the fact that even though the character of the use is
not commercial, the defendant failed to demonstrate the necessity of the verbatim
copying they made to the articles.138
The above-mentioned decisions, along with many other decisions, do not only show
the inconsistency of courts’ decisions with regard to the interpretation and application of
fair use, but they also show the effect of such decisions on the production of creative
works, as well as their impact on motivating creation and innovation. A critical decision
that manifests such outcome is the court’s decision in the case involving “MP3.com.” In
the UMG RECORDINGS, INC. v. MP3.COM, INC. (“MP3.com Case”)139 the Plaintiff’s
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record companies sued MP3.com for copying their recording to MP3 computer servers,
and replaying the recording for MP3 subscribers.140 MP3’s model was based on ripping
the CDs into a data base that MP3.com used to provide for its subscribers who already
owned the CDs offered. Even though MP3 had purchased the CDS from which it ripped
the music of, and offered the service to its users who had previously purchased the CDS,
which means that both MP3 and its users had already paid the music owner compensation
for their use, the court denied the fair use defense and obliged MP3 to pay $53.4 million
as compensational damages for its infringing use.141
The same outcome was reached in the Infinity Broadcasting Corp, v. Kirkwood,142
where Kirkwood operated Media Dial-Up service that allowed consumers to listen to
radio broadcasts, which they already paid for, in remote cities over the phone. The court
of appeal held that Kirkwood’s retransmission was not fair use, on the basis that the
nature of the use itself was not transformative.143
Another decision that reflects how courts can award very excessive damages in a
plausible fair use defense is the court’s decision in Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason
(“Legg Mason Case”).144 The court awarded $19.7 million compensational damages to
be paid by Legg Mason, who is a subscriber of Lowry’s financial newsletters and his
employees made copies of some of the newsletters for their internal research and
analytical use.145
2. Appropriation Art and Fair Use
Lastly, I will discuss below the problem of appropriation art and how courts
perceive this type of art, and the impact of such perception on the innovative productions
on this art. Appropriation art is a type of art that artists produce using preexisting objects
or images in their art with little transformation of the original. Appropriation artists’ intent
140
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is that the viewer recognizes the images they copy. They claim their work is not infringing
on the basis of fair use.
Jeff Koons is considered one of the most famous appropriation artists. In Blanch v.
Koons case, the plaintiff (Blanch) alleged that Koons infringed his copyright in a
photograph, by incorporating a portion of this photograph in collage painting created by
Koons. The court found that Koons copying was justified under fair use on the basis that
Koons’s appropriation photograph was intended to be transformative. 146 On the other
hand, the court in Rogers v. Koons case, where Koons copied a portrayal of a couple and
their puppies, denied justifying Koons’s work under fair use. 147 The court explained its
decision on the basis that the photograph was not famous to be known to viewers of
Koons’s work.148 In addition, the court stated that Koons could have copied parts of the
work instead of copying the wholesale work, and it was not persuaded of the critique
nature of the sculpture. 149
Another significant decision that involved appropriation art, is the Cariou v.
Prince,150 where the plaintiff (Cariou) brought action against an art gallery and its owner,
claiming that the artist copied thirty of his photographs of Jamaicans.151 The Court of
Appeal found that 25 of the artworks are justified under fair use, because they were
transformative and provide total different aesthetic. While, the court did not deal with the
remaining five artworks and left it to the district court to decide on them.152
Accordingly, the problem of appropriation art remains unsettled, while the
appropriation artists are constantly exposed to the risk of being disputed before courts. It
is also clear that court decisions are unpredictable, which accordingly makes it impossible
for appropriation artists to foresee the risk of creating their art; thus, establishing another
exacerbation element to the process of creation and invocation remains.
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C. Demands of a Clearer Fair Use Doctrine:
Fair use stands as one of the significant limitations on copyright. Not only does fair use
promote creativity, through granting the users freedom to use pre-existing works in their
creations, but it also protects socially desirable uses, regardless of their transformative
nature, such as scholarship and news reporting.153 Some literature has been calling for
extended interpretation of fair use and the “transformative” nature of the works, as it is
believed to be the key factor that courts consider when examining a fair use claim.
Economists perceive fair use as the doctrine balancing between the right of public and
their interest to access works and the right on authors and their interest of benefiting from
the works they created on the other hand.154 Ruth Okediji illustrated the importance of fair
use on the welfare of the society by stating “the welfare concern… [is] preserving the
measure of balance between owners and users of copyrighted goods through fair use
…[which] has served to provide a resource for future creativity.”155
The quantity and limits of copyright exceptions that preserves the mentioned balance is
the point of debate between scholars. The difficult question here is to what extent shall
the scope of fair use apply. Fishman stressed on this difficulty by saying: “how board or
narrow constraint scope should be to promote creativity is ultimately a difficult empirical
question that psychologists have yet to resolve”156
1. Impact of Fair Use on Different Fields
In assessing how public welfare could be impacted by the interpretation of fair use
doctrine, I will refer to its impact on various important fields like journalism, education
and arts. For instance, according to a study in which 81 journalists were interviewed, they
have stated that they received conflicting fair use advises in their studies and field of
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work.157 Copyright is perceived as an impediment to the freedom of expression, which
impair journalists in performing their work, thus it is common to rely on fair use to justify
their copying. Nevertheless, courts’ decision in this regard does not help in easing the
problem; especially, where the awards in copyright infringements have been described as
excessive despite of the plausible fair use defense and regardless of the existence of very
minimal or close to zero damages. This exposes journalists to liability risk.158 After all,
the court, in L.A. Times v. Free Republic, found that New York Times’s use was
infringing.159 Moreover, the court ruled in Nuñez v. Caribbean International News, Corp.
that generally unlicensed use of professional journalism photographs is infringing;
however, there could be fair use arguments to journalism mission.160 The language used
by the court is clear manifestation of the ambiguity of fair use concept that lead to the
existing confusion among journalists on the concept. Moreover, such an unattractive work
environment would hinder journalists from achieving their mission, which accordingly
results in loss of societal welfare since journalism plays a significant role in generating
the self-understanding of the society.161
Further, fields are also affected by the application of fair use, specifically the fields
that directly relies on fair use in justifying their copying regardless the degree of
transformation added to the work. Scholars fear that these non-transformative beneficial
uses are undervalued, such as the cases for pure copying for educational, research and
teaching purposes.162 Professor Fisher in his Copyright course stated explicitly that some
parts of the course materials are licensed, while he relied on fair use for the most
materials.163 Had fair use doctrine been clear enough, professor Fisher would have solely
relied on it in providing the educational materials used in his course.
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Finally, in the context of art, as discussed earlier, appropriation art mainly relies
on the fair use doctrine. The artists are constantly exposed to risk considering the
inconsistency in court decision in regard to copyright infringements. The decisions have
varied between justifying the use as fair or not on different considerations including
assessing the degree of transformation of the new work. This is a complex approach
considering that appropriation is a type of art that is based on copying existing
photographs. This explains scholars’ concerns on demotivating the creation and
production of appropriation art. Jacqueline Morley described this concern by stating that
“the future of appropriation art within copyright law will be protected by perpetuation of
the fair use doctrine.”164 She argues that the transformation factor of fair use remains
unclear and courts does not employ a certain criterion in their assessment of the degree of
transformation and the fair use in general. Professor Fisher also underlined the problem
of the unclarity of the term “transformative” in the context of fair use doctrine.165
Consequently, even though arguments are divided on the extent of application of
fair use, there is an agreement that the notion of fair use is still unclear and needs to
establish a sort of criteria for the courts to follow to avoid the inconsistency of case law
and unpredictable court decisions.

2. Expansion of Fair Use Application
Fair use doctrine is an important doctrine in the realm of copyright, since many authors
rely on its justification for copying existing works in the process of creating new works,
in addition to its benefits in justifying copying for criticism, comment, news, reporting,
teaching, scholarship, or research as stated in the Copyright Act.166 Moreover, some types
of arts depend mainly of its justification for its survival, like the appropriation art
discussed earlier. Appropriation art would have ceased to exist if it had no chances of
164
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justifying the copying under the fair use doctrine. Thus, fair use plays a key role in
nourishing the welfare and culture of the society. Nevertheless, as earlier demonstrated,
the interpretation of the fair use itself and its characteristic and features as a doctrine are
not clear. Accordingly, there is a unified call from scholars requiring intervention that
establishes clear standards on the interpretation of fair use and a measuring criteria for the
factors that court needs to consider in determining whether a certain use is fair or not.
A sort of confusion arises from scholar calls for the expansion of copyright subject
matters which is thought to be contradicting with the calls for the expansion of fair use.
This confusion needs to be clarified. Expanding subject matters of copyright does not
conflict the expansion of fair use doctrine as including new technologies and inventions
in the scope of copyright protection is one thing, and allowing fair copying, in whole or
in part of these protected inventions as a material used in producing a new creation or
invention, is another distinct thing.
While there is an existing consensus regarding the need of developing a clearer
fair use, there is a necessary fact that needs acknowledgment under this context; despite
of all the efforts that can be made in developing the concept of fair use, it will never be
able to embrace the rapid development of technology and digital communication
innovations. Technology which its developments and innovations has made it hard for
judges to comprehend all its related factors, including its creation, importance, role,
impact, among many other factors, to be able to consider such factor when deciding to
copyright infringements disputes specifically those which contain fair use defense.
Thus, scholar’s calls need to be shifted from demanding the development of the
interpretation of a doctrine, that will require constant development to cope with
technology, to a more stable aspect that would impact fair use application, with less need
for development. This type of development can be made through analyzing the copyright
infringement and remedial system, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

45

V.

Copyright Infringement System and Proposed Reforms
It has been explained that Copyright entitles authors with exclusive rights to control

the use of their creations. Without obtaining copyright owner’s consent, users will not be
able to use the copyrighted work, subject to the exceptions stated by law such as the
compulsory licenses, first sale, and fair use doctrines. Accordingly, any unauthorized use
of copyrighted work, that has not been explicitly permitted by law, is considered a
copyright infringement. which entitles the copyright owner to claim remedies in
accordance with the law. Because of the ambiguity of the interpretation of copyright
doctrines that is earlier explained, particularly the interpretation of fair use doctrine being
the most used in justifying the use of copyrighted works, it should be analyzed whether
eliminating this ambiguity is the optimal reform required for the copyright system from
the perspective of maximizing innovation and creativity, or reforms should better address
different aspects of the law, particularly the infringement and remedial system.
In this chapter, I will analyze the last problem of copyright system, that is, the unified
structure of the copyright’s infringement system and how this structure affects the rights
of users and its indirect impact on achieving the copyright goal of incentivizing creativity.
Structurally, I will start by explaining the current copyright infringement system and
remedies available therein. Then I will explore its impact on the process of creativity
through analyzing the case law, and emphasizing the outcome in the context of
incentivizing creativity and innovation. Finally, in this context, I will display and analyze
the suggested reform proposals to the current system.
A. Infringement System
The structure of the copyright infringement system is featured as a unified
infringement system, that does not differentiate between different types of infringements.
Once an infringement is established, there are certain remedies available to be claimed by
the copyright owner, regardless of the type of infringement and facts surrounding it.
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1. Establishing Infringement and available Remedies
Section 102 of the Copyright Act provides protection to authors of original work
that is expressed and fixed in any tangible medium. 167 The Copyright Act includes 8
Subject matters of copyright’s protection: literary works, musical works, dramatic works,
pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculpture works, motion
pictures and audiovisual works, sound recordings, and architecture works.168
Section 106 grants copyright owners certain type of monopoly over their created
works, by allowing them to exclusively enjoy four economic rights: 1) the right to
reproduce the copyrighted work; 2) the right to make modifications to the work
“derivative works”; 3) the right to control distribution; and 4) the right to control public
performances of the work.169
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights granted to the copyright owner is
an infringer of the copyright of the owner, which entitles the copyright owner to institute
an action against any infringing act committed. The copyright infringer, according to
section 504, is liable for either the actual damages suffered by the copyright owner in
addition to any additional profits of the infringer, or statutory damages.
Section 504 (c) grants the copyright owner whose work is registered the option to
elect to receive award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action,
instead of the actual damages and profit stated in 504 (b). The amount of statutory
damages award shall range between $750 to $30,000 per infringed copyrighted work.
The second paragraph of the same section adds if the court found the infringement is
willful, the amount of statutory damages award may increase to $150,000 per infringed
work.
The strict language of the statue identifies clearly an infringer as a person who,
without authorization, performs one of the acts that are exclusively reserved for the
copyrights owner, regardless the state of mind of the infringer and the degree of
167
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culpability. Once the act is established there is a single standard compensatory scheme,
except in the case where the defendant’s conduct was willful, as such, the range of
statutory damages could be increased to the sum stated in section 504 (c).170 The statute
then adds that statutory damages are applied in the cases of plausible fair use defense,
where the infringer believed that his or her use of the copyrighted work was fair use.
2. Features of Infringement System
The structure of statutory damages bases its calculation on the “per infringed work”
standard. Which means that the key element here is the number of works the defendant
has infringed and not the occasions on which the defendant has engaged in an
infringement. This language may seem clear enough; nevertheless, it illustrates one of
the problems of ambiguity of the system, that lead users to misinterpreting the law and
being exposed to the risk of facing excessive damages. Determining the number of
infringed work could be confusing; for instance, in the incident of ripping a CD
containing many sound recordings, the infringement could either be considered as one
infringement since it is only one CD that was ripped, or could be considered as multiple
infringements in proportionate to the number of ripped sound recordings. 171 In some
cases the confusion gets more complicated; for instance, if some made a derivative work
out of an existing one, and produced several and different copies of this created derivative
work, how would the number of infringements be calculated. It could either depend on
the number of copied works, the number of the different types of produced derivate work,
or even the number of the copies made in each type of derivative work. Neither the statue
nor the courts laid down a certain criterion for the calculation of the number of infringed
work to satisfy the “per infringed work” structure of statutory damages.
In addition, by examining the case law, it is observed that the “per infringed work”
structure in statutory damages leads to excessive statutory damages awards, which tends
to disregard the amount of harm suffered by the copyright owner and the benefits gained
170
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16:57,

by the infringer, as well as disregarding the degree of culpability of the infringer. This
structure voluntarily forces the copyright owner to elect the statutory damages reward
option, because it automatically waives the burden of proof. In such cases plaintiffs will
neither need to proof that they actually suffered any damages, nor that the infringer made
any profits. Only in the cases where it is proved that the conduct of the infringer was
willful, regardless his or her good faith or the degree of culpability, the award will be
maximized to reach $150,000 per infringed work.
Moreover, copyright infringement system is distinguished for having a single
standard of liability and single standard of compensatory scheme.172 Once an exercise of
one of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner is performed, the liability is
established. The courts do not consider degree of culpability of the infringer, his state of
mind, or the efforts made to avoid infringing. Neither will courts take into consideration
the unclarity of the law that lead to the misinterpretation of the use or the infringing act.
Thus, infringement is established so along as there is a copyright owned by someone and
the unlicensed exercise of one of the exclusive right conferred upon the copyright owner.
Furthermore, the statute grants the plaintiff the right to ask for injunctions. Section
502 of the Copyright Act allows the court to grant temporary or permanent injunctions
as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.173 Before
2006, courts were likely to grant injunctions, whether permanent or temporary, in most
of the copyright disputes. The courts were likely to grant injunctions once there exists a
presumption of irreparable harm. 174 After 2006, precisely after the Supreme Court’s
decision on eBay v. MercExchange175 (a case that involved patent right infringement, in
which the court had to decide on the question of whether injunction reliefs are proper in
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patent disputes) courts started to change their practice.176Currently, it became harder for
courts to grant injunctions in copyright infringements; however, courts created a new
compulsory licenses notion. Where the court determines an amount to be paid for the
copyright owner against allowing the continuation of the work, in equivalence with the
license fees if the use was permitted. Plaintiffs do not have the right to deny this fee and
restrict the continuation of the work, they are obliged to accept this amount of fee and
tolerate the continuation of the work.177
Finally, the court allows plaintiff that prevails in a copyright infringement dispute
to recover the court’s cost and attorney’s fees. It is important to note here that attorney’s
fees, specifically in the United States, can be very high.178
After describing the remedies available for a copyright owner against any
infringement for his or her exclusive rights guaranteed by the statute and granted by
virtue of copyright, it could be observed that, if a potential infringer did not escape
liability and the infringement was determined, he or she will be exposed to heavy
damages. If the plaintiff selected to claim the remedies available under section 504(b),
the infringer will not only forfeit all the profits they gained, but will also compensate the
damages suffered by the copyright owner. If the plaintiff selected to claim statutory
damages, then the infringer will be subject to the amount of penalty that jury elects in
accordance with Section 504 (c). There is also possibility for the payment of license fees;
the new notion taking injunctions role. In addition, the court’s cost and attorney’s fees if
the plaintiff prevailed. These remedies created an unfavorable environment for the users
to feel free to express their innovations, use existing works and build on them, and
produce their expressive contributions to the society. Such remedial structure puts users
under pressure of the fear of expanding their use and expressing their ideas in an
infringing way. After explaining the remedial structure of copyright infringements, we
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will turn to the awarded remedies and analyze the courts application of this structure, and
its impact on achieving the goals of copyright.
B. Awarded Remedies and Innovation Anxiety
The remedies awarded by courts in cases of copyright infringement are often
described as unpredictable, inconsistent and excessive. This shakes the users trust in the
system and causes frustration in expressing their ideas the way they wish. This outcome
is not promising and has its adverse impact on the society. In explaining this outcome, it
has been observed that “the penalties that are imposed on all unauthorized users comes
with a social cost: they drive away potential users of copyrighted content who derive
positive value [to the society].” 179 This is clearly seen by analyzing the case law on
copyright infringements. The inconsistency of court’s decisions pertaining the adoption
of the fair use doctrine was earlier illustrated in chapter three. However, this
inconsistency is not limited to the application of fair use. There is also inconsistency in
interpreting other copyright doctrines such as the idea/expression dichotomy and the
inspiration/copying distinction, as well as other terms and doctrines that are not the focus
of this research.
In addition, the inconsistency of court decisions is extended to decisions on the
compensations and remedies in cases of copyright established infringement.
Furthermore, it has been noted that such decisions are often excessive. Awards of
damages are described as excessive when they are not proportional and far exceeds the
actual damages suffered by the copyright owner. 180 For instance, in cases of weak
evidence of willfulness and where the infringer is not a repeat and awarding high amount
of damages would be described as excessive, because the ratio of punitive to actual
damages in exceptionally high.

179

Adi Libson and Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward the Personalization of Copyright Law, The University of
Chicago Law Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, Symposium: Personalized Law (March 2019), at 527-550.
180
Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, supra note 158, at 477.

51

In this section I will present some contradicting court decisions in awards with very
similar facts. In addition, I will refer to decisions where minimum amount of available
damages were awarded despite of the existence of high degree of culpability, evidential
damages suffered by the copyright owner and profits made by the infringer like in
counterfeiting cases. I will explore on the other hand decisions where there is zero or
minimal degree of culpability, or plausible fair use defense and awards of maximum or
heavy amount of damaged were rendered, even when the nature of the use was not
profiting. This inconsistency of court decisions is the outcome of the structure of
copyright system, which comprises unclear terms that are left for judges to interpret on
ad hoc basis according to the facts surrounding each case. Hence, I argue that this
unclarity of the law and inconsistency of court decisions, as well as the excessive awards
rendered in some cases, creates anxiety for users when deciding to use copyrightable
works in their new creations. This has its outcome of incentivizing innovation and
creativity.
The damages awarded in Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd. 181 manifests the risk
exposure composers face in expressing their creations. George Harrison who has heard
The Chiffons, “He’s So Fine” song six years earlier to his composition, was alleged to
have copied its composition is his composition of My Sweet Lord. Although the Court of
Appeals found that he was not aware of his copying during recording the song.
Nevertheless, the court found substantial similarity between the two compositions and
ordered $1.6 million as a compensation of the infringing act. In its decision, the court
laid down the following principle in stating “it is settled that the intention to infringe is
not essential under Copyright Act.”182
In another resembling case, where Robin Thicker was accused to copy the work of
Marvin Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up” composition in his “Blurred Lines” collaboration
with Pharrell Williams.183 The court found that the similarity between the two works
raised to the level of “improper appropriation” and awarded the plaintiff $5.6 million
181
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damages, in addition to 50% of future proceeds of the song, that were reduced
subsequently to $3.5 million, and the suspension of the 50% royalty of future proceeds.184
In these two cases, the damages awarded are substantially harsh for unintentional
copying, specifically since the boarder lines separating between what constitutes
infringing copying and licit inspiration are not clear. In addition, the lines determining
when the use is fair and when it is not, is also unclear. In this context, Campbell’s case
can be recalled and how the court demonstrated there was actual intentional copying;
nevertheless, because of the transformative nature of the created work the copying was
justified under fair use.185
On the other hand, in Arclightz & Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Video Palace, Inc. 186 a
counterfeit infringement in which the defendant distributed unauthorized copies of a
motion picture, despite the willful conduct and high degree of culpability the court
awarded $750 (the minimum amount of statutory damages available). In this case the
defendant reproduced and distributed DVD and VHS copies of a movie that were either
sold or rented to consumers.187 Thus, it could be noted that the intend to infringe is not
an aggravating factor. Yet, in a much similar case, Macklin v. Mueck188, the court ruled
$300,000 award for posting two poems over the internet. The two cases include similar
circumstances and defendants who are both involved in willful copying act; nevertheless,
the awarded damages were contradicting. The court awarded the minimum amount of
statutory damages available in one case and the maximum amount of statutory damages
available in the other case. The basis of the courts decisions is not clear. This illustrates
the unclarity and inconsistency of court decisions. Setting such wide range of statutory
damages, ranging between $750 to $30,000 and up to $150,000 in willful infringements,
without establishing the criteria upon which courts could refer to in calculating the
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amount of damages is controversial, and leads to the criticized inconsistency of court
decisions.
Another excessive award of statutory damages in a plausible fair use case, is the
court’s decision in the L.A. Times v. Free Republic189, where the court rendered an award
of $1 million. This decision is deemed excessive considering the nonprofit nature of the
use and the facts of the case earlier explained, where L.A Times owned a website that
posted news articles for commentators to express their thoughts on liberal bias.190 The
court also rendered a similar excessive award of $ 19.7 million in Lowry’s Reports, Inc.
v. Legg Mason191. According to the facts of the case, Legg Mason’s staff made a copy of
Lowry’s newsletter, to which Mason was a subscriber. The purpose of copying was for
internal research use. On this basis, Legg Mason thought their use was fair. Nevertheless,
despite the copying was not made directly by Mason and the nature of the use of copying
was analysis for internal use, the court did not justify the copying under fair use doctrine
and ordered $82,000 damages per infringed work. Whereas a contradicting decision was
issued in Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington Inc.192, a case which have very similar
facts. The court awarded $250 (the minimum amount of statutory damages available)
against Legal Times of Washington newspaper that published a Harvard law school
student’s article.193 Which is another manifestation of both facts featuring case law in
copyright infringements, excessiveness of some of the awards and inconsistency.
Moreover, in disputes around broadcasting activities, courts issued two
contradicting decisions. In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. 194 (“Feltner
case’) the court awarded damages of $20,000 per infringed work, which resulted in $8.8
million. The case involved licensing agreement of several television series; Columbia
Pictures sought to terminate the broadcasting licenses when Feltner was delinquent in
paying its royalties. The Jury rendered even larger statutory damages award amounting
189
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$72,000 per infringed work that resulted in total award exceeding $31 million. 195 In
Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood the court rendered a contradicting decision.196 Recall
Kirkwood operated Media Dial-Up service and allowed consumers to listen to radio
broadcasts they already paid for. Even though the infringing act is similar to the act of
Feltner Case, the court awarded the minimum amount of statutory damages available,
because fair use claim was plausible.197
Decisions including infringements of file sharing are also provocative. For instance,
in Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, the court awarded $22,500 per
infringed work against a student for illegal file sharing. The award resulted in total of
$675,000. 198 In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas Rasset 199 , a case that included file
sharing for 24 sound recordings. The court decided $80,000 statutory damages for each
infringed work, despite the court’s recognition that the actual damages were evaluated to
approximate $50. While the total award exceeded $1.92 million.200 Today the use of file
sharing and online streaming websites is popular among individuals, who are mostly not
aware of the infringing nature of their acts, and even if they acknowledge the infringing
nature of their act, they are not aware of the consequences of this infringing act and the
amount of remedies they could be exposed to. There have been several incidents where
copyright owners deceitfully uploaded content on internet websites to induce users to use
this content and then threaten to sue them. 201 This happened in the case where two
attorneys uploaded pornographic films on the internet and threatened to sue the
individuals who downloaded these films.202
The underlined case law reflects the copyright’s system composite environment. It
is thought of as an unhealthy environment for inducing users to perform spontaneously
and produce creative works for the society to benefit from. This environment is perceived
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as more biased towards copyright owners, who are often large firms that runs huge
industries, or individuals that are attached to their works and seek earning its benefits to
the extent of depriving the rest of the society from a significant part of its benefit, that is
allowing the use of this work as a building material to produce new creative works.
Moving back to the utmost excessive awards of damages in the MP3.com case
discussed earlier. The court issued an award that was described as extremely excessive,
and “hardly necessary as a deterrent for a defendant who has not made a penny in profit
of its use, and where the plaintiff had conceded that it could not prove any actual
damages”203. When MP3 provided a beaming service to its consumer through MP3.com
cloud to listen to CDS both MP3 and the consumer had already paid for, it involved in
an act of use that is of great similarity to the act of use of Kirkwood in Infinity
Broadcasting Corp, v. Kirkwood204 case discussed before. The court rendered an award
against Kirkwood with the minimum statutory damages available by law because the fair
use claim was plausible and the plaintiff did not suffer real damages.205 In contrast, in
MP3.com case, the court issued and award $53.4 million, despite the fact that the plaintiff
could not prove any actual damages and that the fair use was plausible, especially when
analyzed in the context of the Betamax case decision. 206 Likewise, the award of the
Feltner case, in broadcasting copyright infringements whose facts were earlier
illustrated, which amounted to $31 million, is also considered as one of the most
excessive awards.207
Copyright owners claim exaggerated damage in terms of the losses they suffer or
the profit the user gains relying on statutory damages. In the Napster case for example, a
German company extended $80 million loan to Napster in an attempt to reach a
settlement with the music recording companies.208 In the Google books project, if the
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court had not found the copying justified under fair use, it would have rendered an award
amounting to $4.5 billion if it settled for the minimum amount of statutory damages
which is $750 per infringed work. Noting that Google’s act was willful so the amount of
statutory damages that were to be available before the court could have reached $150,000
per infringed work. 209 In Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC 210 , a file sharing
copyright infringement, plaintiffs claimed damages around $75 billion damages. 211
Eventually, Lime Wire settled for $150 million.212
Finally, it was stated that the statute grants the copyright owner the right to claim
injunctions, as well as attorney’s fees. Likewise, the damages awards, injunctions could
be severe and attorney fees are presumably high. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v.
Honda Motor Co. the court ordered as a preliminary injunction Honda Motor to post a
bond with the amount of $6 million (a large amount of injunctions).213 In Feltner case,
the court awarded Columbia $722,621 in the motion of attorneys' fees, and $30,646 in
costs.214 Moreover, in BMG v. Cox215, a contributory and vicarious infringement claim
around peer to peer file sharing, the Court of Appeal vacated an award with $8.4 million
for attorney’s fees and costs.
The enormous number of awards involving copyright infringements create a tense
environment to inspire users’ creation and innovation. It is very hard for users to predict
the criteria courts rely on; neither in determining the establishment of an infringement,
nor in determining the amount of statutory damages. Users face constant anxiety due to
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their fear of being litigated and ending up with an unaffordable damages award. The use
of today’s technology and communication among the world requires wide and liability
free access to knowledge and works. It is essential to grant users freedom to innovate and
express their creations, as well as the permission to use existing works as a material for
their creations – this is indeed acknowledged to foster the society and culture.
C. Proposed Reforms
knowledge solutions like compulsory licensing and Creative Commons; establishing
measuring criteria for statutory damages decisions; reforming infringement structure of
copyrights; amending the copyright act; expanding the copyright’s subject matter; and
even limiting the grant of copyright as much as possible. This part will focus on analyzing
some of the suggested reforms that control and minimize the copyright system’s
problems we discussed above.
1. Calls for Reform
As discussed earlier, strong copyright system limits the use of existing works and has a
significant effect on the process of innovation and creativity. Economists have focused
their scholarship on the discussion of copyright constraints and the impact of tightening
or loosening such constraints on the production of creative and innovative works and its
outcome on the social welfare. Part of this scholarship illustrates the importance of
balancing between the rights of the copyright owners and the rights of the users of the
copyrighted works to the public welfare. While there is consensus on the importance of
having an incentive structured system that ensures the sustainable production of creative
works and innovations.216 The heated debate is centered around the extent of narrowing
down the constraints and the borderline between narrowing down the constraints in a
way that encourage and incentivize creativity, without extremely narrowing it down in a
way that deprives authors from their exclusive rights granted by law through copyright.
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It is observed that the stronger the copyright system is and the more constraints it
enforces on copyright, the less freedom it provides for users to build on existing work
and express their creations. The debatable issue among scholars is the extent of
diminishing or eliminating these constraints so as not to dismantle the essence of
copyright. There are no existing arguments in favor of permitting copying or imitating:
the arguments incline towards allowing copying to a certain extent so long as it will lead
to the production of a new transformative work that is beneficial to the society. The limit
of copying that is allowed is the point of conflict between scholars.
Therefore, I will move on to analyze some of the proposed reforms suggested to mitigate
the problems we earlier discussed, which would lead to creating a more proper
environment that encourage creativity.
2. Reforms Addressing Sole Problems
In this part, I will analyze reform proposals that focuses only one of the earlier discussed
problems of copyright. Those proposal do not suggest a reform for the whole copyright
system in an aim to restore the balance of the system. It rather aims to solve one problems
that is considered a great obstacle in the creation process and its mitigation will
incentivize creativity and flourish social welfare.
a. Fair Use:
It had been earlier demonstrated that there is consensus among scholars on the unclarity
of the fair use doctrine and the way of its application by courts. Hence, scholars have
been calling for the reform and development of this doctrine and establishing clear
criteria for courts to use in deciding on fair use disputes. One of these calls for fair use
reform suggested changing the nature of fair use application, by applying fair use as a
right to “alleviate some of the doctrine’s inherent problems and is the best long-terms
solution for eliminating abusive litigation from copyright law.”217 This proposed reform
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targets the application of the doctrine by judges, as well as reform of the legislative and
administrative framework of fair use.218 Such proposal appears as an adequate solution
for the problem of fair use and the inconsistency of its application through courts,
whether in deciding on its adaption or on deciding on the damages compensated for
infringements in plausible fair use cases.
Despite the agreement between scholars on the need of developing a clearer fair use
doctrine. Yet, all efforts of law reform, to regulate copyright system by removing the
identified vagueness of fair use and other involved terms (e.g., “transformative”), will
not able to embrace the rapid development of technology and its related innovations,
which makes it impossible for the reform of such doctrines like fair use to embrace all
the new creative ideas and innovations. Thus, to focus on developing the fair use doctrine
it will need constant reform, which is will not be easily implemented because of two main
factors. First fair use is currently an ad hoc doctrine interpreted according to judges’
discretion which will take years to influence and change along with technological
changes. Second, if the law aims to regulate the interpretation and application of fair use
more clearly, it will not be easy to constantly change and reform the legislation with the
rapid digital and technology development.
Thus, we cannot ignore the fact that regardless the number of amendments applied
on the statue and the introduction of a measuring criteria that direct courts in deciding
whether a certain use is fair or not; fair use would still not be able to accommodate the
expedite progress of technology and digital communications. Between the time
researchers identify a certain problem and calls for its reform and the time when the
system actually responds to such calls, hundreds if not more of unforeseen new
innovation would be produced. This will make it impossible for the statute and the
adopted measures to embrace these new innovations in a way that mitigates the problem,
and leads to a more clear and efficient application of fair use, to encourage users’
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expression of their ideas and works. Thus, copyright is situated in a position that needs
frequent and fast change.
b. Personalizing Copyright Protection
Another proposed reform is personalizing copyright protection based on the
characteristics of copyright users and personalizing the damages awards based on the
same characteristics. 219 This reform focused on the economic lens of copyright and
achieving its optimum goal through taking measures that expand the benefits of the
copyrighted work and reduce deadweight loss. It included the proposal to decide on
statutory damages on the basis of consideration of the users’ personal characteristics. The
suggestion is that statutory damages shall be diminished if the infringers are not
interested in purchasing the copyrighted content. In addition to introducing a whole
liability exemption to certain group of users if their purchase expectancy is close to
zero.220 As said, this proposal focuses on maximizing the benefits of copyrighted works
and reducing the deadweight loss from economic perspective, without referring to the
core of copyright system problems that need adjustment, which basically revolves around
the unclarity, unpredictability and ambiguity of the system.
c. Orphan Works
Recalling chapter two that discussed the problem of orphan works and some suggested
proposals to unravel it. This proposal is one of the proposals emphasized in the context
of avoiding the cost of inconsistent court decisions and excessive remedial awards;
however, it is especially designated to alleviate the orphan works problem.
It has been suggested that the use of orphaned work shall be interpreted within the
realm of fair use doctrine. However, this suggestion is not evidently suitable, since fair
use is a doctrine applied by courts on ad hoc basis according to each court’s interpretation
and justifications. This does not mitigate the threat that users fear in utilizing orphaned
work, which would not have the expected impact of maximizing creativity. The problems
219
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of unclarity of fair use doctrine and its application by courts needs to be addressed and
settled before considering incorporating orphan works within the doctrine.
An alternative, more suitable, adjustment is limiting the remedies available for the
use of orphan works through a statutory exception or limitation. This adjustment was
proposed by the US Copyright’s Office. This limitation applies to good faith users who
conducted reasonable diligent search in attempt to locate the owner of the orphan work;
nevertheless, this search was unsuccessful, in addition to attributing the work to its author
if possible.221 Moreover, the proposal suggested limiting the scope of injunctions. This
way the users’ fear of the consequences of the reappearance of the copyright owner is
alleviated, and thus the users can confidently use the orphaned work in their new
creations. It will also encourage the users to provide the necessary information to be
easily allocated to guarantee earning the benefits of their creation.
This suggestion seems constructively suitable, especially when applied properly
through providing clear definitions and interpretation to its terms, especially by clarifying
what is considered an orphan work, what is the criteria of the due diligence search and
good faith requirements and so forth. Nevertheless, it only addresses one of the many
problems of copyright system, leaving the remaining problems unsolved, which still
impairs the process of creation and innovation.
3. Reforms Addressing Boarder Problems
Reforms subject to this sub-section’s discussion are addressing specifically the remedies
awarded by courts in copyright infringements. The copyright owner, as explained in
section one of this chapter, in claiming remedies for a copyright infringement has the
right to elect either to receive an award with the actual damages he suffered in addition
to infringer’s profits, or elect receiving statutory damages. The first proposal that is
discussed suggests a reform in statutory damages structure. While the second proposal
suggests reform in the infringement structure itself and accordingly all available
monetary damages.
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a. Statutory Damages Reform
This proposal is suggested by Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland to address the
problem of statutory damages. They believed that statutory damages are perceived
“frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled and sometimes grossly excessive.”222
This is due to the unclarity of copyright law in many of its aspect, in addition to the wide
range of damages amount available for judges to decide on statutory damages. Moreover,
there are no criteria or indication provided by the statute to guide the court or the jury in
determining the appropriate amount of statutory damages. This proposal suggests
reforms of the statutory damages regime which considers other damages provided by the
Copyright Act to deter infringements, in addition to developing principles that would
guide courts to decide on the appropriate amount of statutory damages.223
A distinction must be made between the compensational function of awards and the
deterring function. 224 It is necessarily fair to compensate the copyright owner for the
actual damages they suffered from the infringing act. However, as we earlier observed
there is a significant number of cases in which huge damages were awarded without the
copyright owners ability to successfully prove the damages they suffered. Likewise, in
observing courts awards in the context of deterring function, we will find that in some
counterfeiting cases the court awarded the minimum available amount of damages, while
awarding the maximum in very plausible fair use cases. Thus, it is hard to understand the
determining criteria courts follow in their decisions.
While discussing statutory damages, the Congress stressed on its compensatory
nature and clarified that it is intended to compensate copyright owners who are not able
to prove the damages they suffered, because damages in copyright disputes are not
always easily demonstrated. In addition, the Congress also referred to its deterring
intentions. However, it had not been clarified neither by the Congress nor courts the
limits of the compensatory part and the deterring part of the damages scheme. 225
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Accordingly, courts have been left to decide, based on their discretionary powers or
jury’s decision, which resulted in the inconsistent decisions we discussed.
Therefore, the suggested reforms of this proposal created a set of principles, which
the courts shall follow, in determining the amount of statutory damages in copyright
infringements.226 These principles are classified into what the court should do or consider
when awarding statutory damages, and what they should not do.227
The proposal suggested first that courts should award minimum amount of statutory
damages in cases of innocent infringers in plausible fair use cases, in ordinary
infringements cases where the copyright owner did not suffer any or suffered minimal
damages, and in cases where plaintiff’s misconduct is found.228 The proposal stated that
in ordinary infringements the plaintiff should be awarded statutory damages equivalent
to the damages they suffered. Ordinary infringements are classified as cases where the
infringer did not know or expect that their conduct was infringing. Either because of
misinterpretation of the law or a reasonable reason to assume that the conduct is not
infringing. The second suggestion is that courts shall award statutory damages equivalent
to the damages suffered by the copyright owner plus the profits of the infringing user, in
secondary liability cases.
The proposal goes further to suggest a scheme for certain cases where the infringer
knew about their infringing conduct, the court would amount the damages to multiple
two or three times the profits of the infringer. In addition to including the other monetary
awarded decisions, like attorney’s fees, when deciding the amount of statutory
damages.229
Afterwards, for willful infringers with aggravating circumstance, such as repeat
infringer or counterfeiters, courts shall decide damages equivalent to more than three
multiples of the defendant’s profits, in addition to compensating the damages they
suffered.
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The proposal includes other suggestions such as obliging the judges to explain why
they consider the awarded damages “just.” Then it suggests what the courts should avoid
doing in awarding statutory damages, which includes among others, not maximizing
statutory damages on the basis of finding willful infringement, and not awarding statutory
damages per infringed work.230
This proposal, as said, addresses solely the problem on statutory damage and
developing criteria for the courts to follow to avoid the existed unclarity, inconsistency
of court decisions, and rendering excessive damages awards, which has been demanded
by many scholars. Nevertheless, the existence of the scheme of statutory damages per se
is questionable. Do we actually need the scheme of statutory damages in copyright
infringements while the statute provides that the infringer shall be liable for copyright
owner’s actual damages and infringer’s additional profits?
Supposing that the courts apply the developed criteria, proposed by Samuelson and
Wheatland, in awarding statutory damages. What would that outcome be in case like
MP3.com, where the infringer knew that his conduct is infringing and yet decided to take
the risk and proceed with it. If the courts found that the defendant’s arguments are close
to fair use justification then it would award the minimum amount of statutory damages.
If this amount is applied according to the “per infringed work” principle, then it would
also lead to very excessive damages award. If the courts followed the suggestion and
avoided applying the “per infringed work” principle, then it would award an equivalent
amount of the suffered damages. In this assumption, what would be the difference
between statutory damages awards and other copyright infringement damages award.
Moreover, this proposal did not deal with the award of injunctions and awarding
attorney’s fees, which also have a significant impact on the users and threat they face.
On the other hand, this proposal did not deal with the problem where users still face
other monetary awards that are still described as excessive, unpredictable and
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inconsistent, and are considered a threat for users which incumbers their innovation and
creativity process.
4. Infringement Classification Reform
Moving to the second proposal, as suggested by Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky. The proposal, based on an analysis of the types of copyright
infringements, suggests classifying copyright infringements into certain categories and
therefore the remedies that applies to each category.231 The aim of this proposal is to
avoid the excessive fear of copyright infringement penalties that lead to diminishing
socially desirable uses of existing works, which impact the production of more beneficial
creative works for the society.232
It is observed that the fixed one standard design of copyright’s liability regime serves
against the goals of copyrights. It casts threats over the users of existing works, and does
not manage the problems of copyrights, which makes the structure of copyright more
complex.
Therefore, this proposal suggests “a radical reform in the way copyright law assigns
liability.”, 233 by introducing three categories of infringements. First, the “inadvertent
infringements”, which include cases where the infringer is unaware or could have not
been reasonably aware of the nature of their infringing act.234 Thus, there is no culpability
demonstrated in this category. This applies to cases we previously discussed such as
Harrisongs Music,235 and Pharrell William,236 where they both were unaware of their
copying act. Generally, cases involving the inspiration/copying principles, where courts
apply the total “concept and feel” test, are classified under this category. In addition,
cases which includes misinterpretation of facts due to the unclarity of copyright system
itself should also be included under this category. An example of such type of
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infringements is the Rite of Spring case,237 where Walt Disney misinterpreted the limits
of the license granted by Boosey and believed that their act was not infringing. Such
cases shall be included in this category, if the infringer reasonably misinterpreted the
facts because of the ambiguity of the system itself.
The remedies available for this category are only compensational, as there is no
intention to infringe, and accordingly no role for deterrence in this type of infringements.
Remedies here are constructed to compensate the actual losses suffered by the copyright
owner. The copyright owner shall not be entitled to neither statutory damages nor profits
of infringer. Injunctive reliefs should also be excluded from this category.238
The second category is “standard infringements”, which includes a certain degree of
culpability. It includes infringement cases where the infringers had a reasonable
justification to believe that their acts are not infringing.239 This applies to plausible fair
use cases that we earlier discussed such as L.A. Times v. Free Republic,240 Legg Mason241,
Kirkwood,242and many other cases analyzed in the previous chapters. The users in this
category are aware of the copying act; nevertheless, they assumed for a reasonable
justification that the copying act is not infringing. In such case the court decides whether
to accept the alleged justification and find the act non-infringing, or disagrees and
establishes the infringement.
In this category, if the court established the infringement, the plaintiff should be able
to recover the actual damages they suffered, in addition to a portion of the infringer’s
profits. In this type of infringement, courts are required to find a fair profit sharing
scheme, where the infringer does not lose all its profits and the copyright owner does not
make a fortune out of the infringer’s use. It is proposed by bell and Parchomovsky that
under this category the plaintiff can substitute profits with statutory damages. In this case
statutory damages should be reduced. Besides, injunctions could be granted under this
237
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category if it was proved that the continuation of the infringing act would inflict a noncompensational harm on the copyright owner.243
The remedial structure for this category of infringements promotes copyright’s
goals. This is because it encourages users to seek licenses before the use of existing works
to avoid being litigated before courts. At the same time, it does not inflict great threat on
users who do not obtain licenses in a way that repels them from using the work to produce
their creations. Because even if they are litigated and the infringement is established
against them, the award would be affordable. Since they will only forfeit part of the
profits they gained. Moreover, this structure will limit the copyright owner’s powers, in
a way that balances the bargaining powers between the copyright owner and the user in
negotiating licenses.
The third category is willful infringements, whose infringer are found culpable. This
includes acts of mere copying without neither authorization nor justification for the act.
Counterfeits, pirates and repetitive infringers are included under this category. 244
Deterrence is necessary in this case, and thus plaintiffs should be allowed to claim all
types of remedies available by law. This includes losses suffered by the copyright owner,
profits of the infringer, injunctive reliefs, and can opt to elect claiming statutory
damages.245
In this proposal Bell and Parchomovsky also provided a forecast of the
administrative cost of such reform. They clarified the reason of reducing the infringement
categories in their proposal into three categories only. They reasoned this reduction to
efficiently minimize the administrative cost of its application. Since tools were not
available to precisely measure the degree of moral wrong upon which the multiple
categories shall be grounded.
This proposal appears to be the most suitable for reforming copyright’s system
structure. It will lead to a great extent of flexibility in encompassing all the problems and
obstacles the copyright system suffers, whether the current or the future unforeseen ones.
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This is because it does not rely on analyzing the infringing act per se to establish its
classification, which accordingly would be frequently changed with its perceptions,
along with the technological and digital progress. It rather, when classifying the
infringements, focuses on the user’s degree of guilt and culpability. This, contrary to the
nature of the act of copying, is not impacted by the technological and digital progress.
The only problem that was not included in this proposal is dealing with orphan
works. If a user has made in good faith diligent search to locate a copyright owner but
failed and decided to proceed with using the work, this user should not suffer the outcome
of the reappearing copyright owner. Thus, it is suggested that this case should be included
in the first category “inadvertent infringements”.
Additionally, allowing the election of statutory damages in the second category
“standard infringements” needs to be reconsidered. Statutory damages with its current
scheme that provides a wide range for damages, starting from $750 to $30,000 and up to
$150,000 in willful cases, calculated on the “per infringed work principle”, would lead
to excessive damages in cases of plausible fair use, which is an outcome we seek to avoid.
Even if such statutory damages are decreased to its minimum, in cases such as MP3.com
and Feltner, it would lead to excessive damages. In addition, if in a future unforeseen
case, such as the Google books project where the court did not justify the copying act,
this would lead to enormous penalty.
Accordingly, it is suggested that statutory damages claims be restricted to the cases
of the third category “willful infringements”, since such cases demonstrate a high degree
of culpability and deterrence will be necessary to prevent them. Moreover, this allows
the plaintiff to be compensated in cases where they were not able to prove the actual
damages they suffered.
Adopting this proposed reform and applying the mentioned two suggestions would
lead to a full infringement structure that addresses most of the significant copyright
problems. This results in creating a more stable and favorable environment that helps the
users to assess the outcome of their use and thus encourages them to make easier decision
in their use and expressions.
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VI.

Conclusion:

The Optimum goal of copyright is to maximize the production of creative works through
incentivizing authors to produce more creative works. This is done by granting these
authors exclusive monopoly rights that enable them to control the work they have created
and benefit from its use. The problem emanates when it becomes notable that the tools
copyright relies on to incentivize creativity actually hinder its process and diminish the
production of more creative works.
Granting authors this type of monopoly resulted in depriving the creators from using
the existing copyrighted work as a material for new creations and innovations. This has
its outcome on the society: it reduces the number of new works that should benefit the
society, either culturally or for its social welfare. The net result is that the interest of the
copyright owner is privileged over the interest of other users and the entire society.
Moreover, the copyright system itself is not clear enough to enable its users to assess
their acts and predict the outcome of their use. The ambiguity of many copyright terms;
the lack of having a clear criterion that measures the infringing work; the unclarity of
distinguishing

copying

from

inspiration;

the

orphan’s

work

problem;

the

misinterpretation of copyright doctrines like fair use; parody; and even examining the
licenses and their scope, all these reasons attribute to the creation of an unfavorable
environment that eliminates the freedom of creation and innovation.
Furthermore, the inconsistent court decisions in deciding on disputes of copyright
infringements exacerbates the problems of the copyright system, as it makes it more
difficult for users to understand the system. Adding that courts tend to frequently render
very excessive damages, more than what an ordinary user could afford, especially when
rewarding a statutory damage.
All these factors serve against achieving the goal of copyright and strikes the
balance sought to be achieved between the interest of copyright owner and the interests
of the users and therefore the society on the other side. This situation made it essential to
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call for a system reform in a way that retrieves this balance. Accordingly, in this paper I
discussed the significant problems that exacerbate the process of creation and innovation.
Then, I analyzed some of the proposed reforms that facilitate the access to and use of
existing copyrighted work to produce new creative works. Finally, I came to the
conclusion that the proposals addressed to reform the infringement and remedial structure
are more convenient than those suggesting to establis certain criteria to clarify the unclear
doctrines and terms. This is because all efforts of law reform to regulate copyright system
by identifying and regulating the vague terms and doctrines will not be able to embrace
the rapid development of technology, communication and their related innovations.
Addressing infringement and remedies conveniently appears to be a more stable solution.
I also concluded that the reform proposed by Bell and Parchomovsky in classifying
the types of infringements and their available remedies is the most suitable proposal for
achieving copyright’s goal. This reform suggested introducing three categories of
infringement. First, inadvertent infringements, for users who were unaware of the
infringing nature of their acts. Such users should be only liable for the actual losses
suffered by the copyright owner due to their use. Second, standard infringements, which
includes cases were users reasonably believed that their copying act is justified under
law. Those users should be liable for the actual damages suffered by the copyright owner,
in addition to some of the profits they made. This could be granted through a fair profit
sharing scheme or reduction of statutory damages. Third, the willful infringements,
which includes those who blatantly copied the existing work, and thus, should be
subjected to all remedies available by the law.
I suggested including in the first category of infringement cases the use of orphan
works, to lift the threat casted on these users and encourage their use by creators. I also
recommended to remove the option for the plaintiff to elect statutory damages in
“standards infringements” cases, even if reduced to its minimum, to avoid having
excessive awards.
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The Egyptian System
Lastly, while exploring the Egyptian copyright system, with the aim to understand
its position from the discussed problems and analyze their reforms, I found limited
literature addressing the problems of copyright in the Egyptian system. Critically, all of
the existing literature addresses only one aspect of public interest in copyright, that is
protecting author by securing their rights in their expressed works. On the other side, the
literature ignored the other aspect of the equilibrium, which is of the same importance,
that is protecting the right of public interest through allowing wide access to copyrighted
works and allowing their use as a building material for new creations and innovations
which benefits the society. Therefore, I explore the possibility of applying the outcome I
have reached, from analyzing the problems of the US copyright system and the proposed
reforms, on the Egyptian system. My aim is to call for the Egyptian legislature and judges
to consider easing the constraints on copyrights and encourage users to produce new
creations.
This can be achieved through two steps. First, by introducing the “transformative”
nature into the notion of fair use in the Egyptian system. Second, by reclassifying the
infringements and remedies available under the Egyptian copyright law.
Before discussing the suggested reforms, on the one hand we need to explore the
Egyptian copyright system in the context of fair use doctrine and on the other hand we
need to analyze infringements and available remedies. Copyright in Egypt is governed
by Law No. 82 of 2002 pertaining the protection of intellectual property right
(“EIPC”).246 In addition, to the Egyptian Civil Code that generally regulates property and
tortious liability in Egypt (“ECC”).247 Article 141 of the EIPC provides for exceptions to
copyright protection, including official documents and news.248 In addition, Article 171
provided that the author may not prevent third parties from performing the work in family
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or educational context; making a single copy for personal use; or making analysis of the
work for the purpose of criticism, discussion, or information. The law provides nothing
on the creation of transformative nature of works or parody.249 The Egyptian Ministry of
Communication and Information Technology, in one of its presentation in a WIPO
summit, stated in regards to the application of fair use in Egypt: “we must often look to
the nature and objects of selection made, the quantity and value of material used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, of the original
work.”250 In the same summit, the Ministry’s representative added that “exceptions are
meant to achieve a balance between the rights of the copyright holder with the rights of
the public.”251 Except for the discussed nothing regarding fair use was explicitly stated
in the EPIC.
On the other hand, for a copyright infringement to be established under the Egyptian
law, the user has to perform one of the acts stated in Article 181 of the EIPC, the most
relevant in our discussion is the act of infringing any of the moral or economic copyrights
or related rights provided for in this law. 252 The same Article provides the available
remedies concerning copyright infringement. First, there is an imprisonment penalty for
a period not less than one month, in addition to a monetary fine ranging between EGP
5,000 and EGP 10,000. This amount increases in case of repetition to range between EGP
10,000 and EGP 50,000, and the imprisonment duration increases to be not less than
three months. The monetary fine is multiplied according to the number of infringed
works.253
From the above explained structure, it is observed that copyright infringements in
Egypt are also structurally unified. Infringement is established regardless of the intention
and degree of culpability of the infringer. Which actually complies with the Egyptian
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civil law principles of tortious liability that expects a compensation to any act causing
harm in accordance with Article 163 of the ECC.254 It is also observed that the only
monetary remedy available under the EIPC is the fines stated in Article 181. This
remedial scheme resembles the remedial scheme of statutory damages available under
the US Copyright Act. As explained earlier, while analyzing the US system’s problems,
this structure creates a non-favorable environment for users that discourage them to build
up on existing works and produce new creations. This is an obvious result since the users
will fear being subjected to excessive damages awards as a result of their use, moreover
there is the threat of being imprisoned according to the EPIC.
Having said that, it is important to highlight that the Egyptian copyright system did
not face the same problem of inconsistency in the case law found in the United Stated.
This is due to the fact that the number of copyright disputes involving good faith copying
or fair use before courts is limited. The reason for this is not clear and it is out of the
scope of this research. However, among the general reasons may be that the relevant
party obtained licenses, settlement agreements being pushed by the delay of the litigation
process, or unawareness and ignorance of copyright issues, all of this could be the reason
for not bringing disputes to the court. Which makes it difficult to analyze the situation
given that the Egyptian courts do not measure fair use the way it is measured by the US
courts. This means that the courts do not consider the degree of “transformation” of the
alleged infringing work to decide whether the copying is justified under fair use or not,
alternatively they refer to the copyright exceptions stated by the legislator in Article 171
of the EPIC.255 This can be explained considering that Egypt is a civil legal system, which
only allows judges to render their decisions based on codified legal rule stated in the law.
Nevertheless, it is important for the Egyptian judges to consider balancing between the
rights of the copyright owner from one side and the right of the user and the public
interest benefiting from the new creations on the other side.
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Considering the above limitation in the civil legal system, Egyptian courts would
not be able to expand the application of fair use unless it is based on a codified rule of
law. The closest principle that could be deployed by courts in justifying fair use in
transformative works is the general principle stating that there should be no harm or foul
(“no harm”) and its subsequent principles. “No harm” is an Islamic Sharia’ principle that
is adopted by the Egyptian courts in determining the limitation and restrictions on the use
of rights.256 Deriving from it the subsequent principle that states greater damage pushes
lighter one,257 this consequently means that the public benefit prevails over the private.
This is also confirmed by principle prohibiting the abuse of right articulated in Article 4
and 5 of the ECC, which provides that the exercise of rights is limited by the misuse or
abuse of its exercise. According to the Egyptian Court of Cassation, the exercise that its
results are far less beneficial than the damages inflicted upon other by such exercise, is
considered as an abusive exercise of right.258
By applying this on copyright we can justify the lighter damages suffered by the
copyright owner, in case of using his work as a building material to produce new creative
work, with the heavier damages lifted from the public and the benefits they gain from the
new produced work.
Yet, this leaves us with the same questions that were asked before: to what extent
should fair use be expanded, how can we measure the degree of transformation of created
works, how can we ensure that the measuring criteria covers all aspects, including
unforeseen ones, of possible use. Moreover, the copyright owner could chase the alleged
infringer and claim compensation in accordance with the “enrichment without cause”
principle of the Egyptian law.
Enrichment without cause is a principle provided under Article 179 of the ECC
which provides that any person that gets richer, without a legitimate cause, at the expense
of another has to compensate the latter for the damage they suffered.259 To establish an
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enrichment without cause claim, there are three condition that needs to be fulfilled. First,
the defendant getting richer. Second, the plaintiff suffering damages. Third, having no
legitimate cause behind this enrichment (i.e., contract, rule of law).260
This means that the copyright owner can establish that they suffered damages and
the alleged infringer made profits out of his use, in addition to the lack of a contract or
rule of law regulating the alleged infringer’s use, which entitles the copyright owner to
claim compensation for the damages they suffered. In such a claim, the judge will rule in
accordance with the general principles of ECC regardless of remedies available under
the EIPC.261
This suggestion lessens the harm that could be inflicted upon a user that builds his
new creative product on an already existing work; nevertheless, it neither negated the
threat nor created a favorable environment that encourage users to flourish the society
with their creations.
On the other hand, it is important to explore the imprisonment sanctions available
under the EPIC. Article 181 of the EPIC provides seven types of acts which are
considered copyright infringement and are punished by the sanctions introduced in the
same Article.262 One of these sanctioned acts is infringing any of the moral or economic
copyrights or related rights provided for in this law (the EPIC).263 The first paragraph of
this Article provide the sanctions available which includes imprisonment for a period of
not less than one month, that is exceeded to three months in case of repetitive infringer.264
The Egyptian legislator in this part provided the criminal sanction of the infringing act
without stipulating any criteria or measures to be followed in determining such
imprisonment sanction, leaving it to be determined upon the discretion of the judge based
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on the facts of each cases independently. It is also observed that the willfulness nature of
the infringing act or the degree of culpability were not referred to in the law.
On the contrary, the US legislator when providing the criminal sanctions for
copyright infringement, even though such sanctions are harsher than those provided by
the Egyptian law, the US legislator explicitly stated in Section 506 of the Copyright Act
that sanctions are applied to any person who infringes a copyright willfully. The statute
then added that the purpose of the infringement must be for commercial advantage or
private financial gain. 265 Moreover, in determining the proper criminal sanction, the
statute in Section 2319 classified the infringing acts and provided a fix penalty for each
of these acts. The statute even provided measures for some of the infringing acts
classified under Section 2391, by stating the minimum required number of copies
produced or distributed, the duration of such distribution and the monetary value of the
made copies.266 Without meeting these requirements the infringer will not be subjected
to such criminal sanctions.
These criminal sanctions of the US copyright system have not been praised by many
of the scholars because of the extraordinary nature of the copyright system and its
sensitive nature that affects directly the process of creation and personally the creators
themselves. Scholars fears the excessive use of criminal sanctions and its impact on the
copyright system and creation.267 This unfavorable outcome is manifested in the incident
of Aoron Swartz was a fellow at Harvard’s Safra Center. He downloaded on a hard a
large number of journal articles from JOSTR website aiming to make them available to
the public. He was arrested before making such articles available to the public and
returned all the data to JOSTR. Despite JOSTOR’s affirmation that they did not suffer
any losses and are not pursuing to claim damages from Swartz, he was still indicted and
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his prosecution moved forward and was exposed to up to 35 years of imprisonment if
convicted. This outcome pushed Swartz to finally commit suicide at the age of 26.268
Even though the Egyptian system did not face similar incidents, and provides less
imprisonment sanctions for copyright infringement cases. The law does not provide any
measuring criteria to decide upon such sanctions and does not require culpability or
willfulness to a condition for the entitlement of these sanctions, it leaves it to the
discretionary powers of the judge. This power vested to judges allows for the expansion
of use of criminal sanctions in copyright disputes which will impact copyright’s goal and
create imbalance in its system.
Accordingly, and considering the civil nature of the Egyptian legal system, I
recommend introducing the transformative works into the fair use justification and
amending the legislation itself to create a legal rule that specifically classifies the
copyright infringement into categories with sanctions scheme specified for each
category, to avoid any unpredicted outcome that would arise from judges’ trials to base
their justification of a copying act on extensively broad existing rules of law. This can be
made through either, as expressed before, developing the fair use doctrine through
introducing the production of transformative works, which is not preferable considering
the rapid technological development as illustrated earlier, which will make it hard to
predict future innovation and predetermine them in the fair use exception. The sought
result of eliminating the threat cased upon users will not be achieved in this proposal.
Another proposal is to amend the legislation through introducing a new infringement
structure, using a similar proposal to the one suggested by Bell and Parchomovsky with
few alterations that fit the Egyptian legal structure.
Based on the second proposal, the infringement can be divided into three categories.
The first category is “simple infringement” for those who used the copyrighted work as
a building material in their new creations. Those users should only be liable for paying a
determined fair amount that is equivalent to license fees. The second category is “gross
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infringements” which includes infringements made by users in good faith without being
aware of their infringement action; nevertheless, the copyright owner suffered damages
due to this infringing act. Under this category infringer should be asked to compensate
for all the actual damages suffered by the consumer and loss of profits that could be
proved. This complies with the general principle stipulated in Article 221 of the ECC
that requires the compensation to include the actual damages and loss of profits.269 The
third category is “willful infringements” this includes counterfeiters, pirates, illegal
copying, or any other willful copying that is not justified under fair use or by the
production of a new transformative creative work. In this case the penalties stated in the
EIPC shall apply, including the imprisonment penalty for a duration not less than one
month. Plus, monetary fine ranging between EGP 5,000 and EGP 10,000, which shall be
increased in case of repetition to imprisonment penalty for a duration not less than three
months and monetary fine ranging between EGP 10,000 and EGP 50,000.
I also recommend that in this case we calculate the actual damages suffered by the
copyright owner and the profits made by the infringer and award whichever is greater
form the fine stated by the EIPC or the actual damages suffered by the copyright owner
plus the profits made by the infringer. This infringement and remedial structure can
substitute the second part of Article 181 of the EIPC which identifies the remedies
available in case of establishing a copyright infringement.
Finally, I conclude that both copyright systems in the US as well as Egypt have
focused on securing the rights of the copyright owner while neglecting to regulate and
protect the rights of potential users that the public also benefits from their creations. Thus,
there is a necessity to develop and reform the copyright system to address such an issue.
Such efforts should be especially directed towards the copyright infringement structure
and available remedies, rather than expanding the exceptions on copyrights, precisely,
the fair use doctrine. Creating a system that relies on the type of infringement and
available remedy is more stable and predictable; while on the other hand, relying on the
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interpretation of a doctrine is inflexible and would accordingly fail to foresee future
technological progress and innovations.
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